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Critical Discourse Studies: A Sociocognitive Approach¹

Teun A. van Dijk

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Terminology and definitions

Although critical approaches to discourse are commonly known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), I prefer to speak of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). This more general term suggests that such a critical approach not only involves critical *analysis*, but also critical *theory*, as well as critical *applications*. The designation CDS may also avoid the widespread misconception that a critical approach is a *method* of discourse analysis.

For the same reason, I favour the term Discourse Studies (DS), rather than Discourse Analysis, to designate a multidisciplinary field of scholarly activities that are obviously not limited to the *analysis* of text and talk. Moreover, as a *discipline*, DS has many types and methods of analysis: it is not ‘a’ method among others within the humanities and the social sciences.

CDS is not a method, but rather a critical *perspective*, *position* or *attitude* within the discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies. Critical

research makes use of a large number of methods, both from Discourse Studies itself, as well as from the humanities, psychology and the social sciences.

The critical approach of CDS characterizes scholars rather than their methods: CDS scholars are sociopolitically committed to social equality and justice. They also show this in their scientific research, for instance by the formulation of specific goals, the selection and construction of theories, the use and development of methods of analysis and especially in the application of such research in the study of important social problems and political issues.

CDS scholars are typically interested in the way discourse (re)produces social *domination*, that is, the *power abuse* of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively *resist* such abuse.

CDS is not just any social or political research, as is the case in all the social and political sciences, but is premised on the fact that some forms of text and talk may be *unjust*. One of the tasks of CDS is to formulate the norms that define such 'discursive injustice'. CDS aims to expose and help to combat such injustice. It is *problem-oriented* rather than discipline- or theory-oriented. Such a research policy presupposes an *ethical* assessment, implying that discourse as social interaction may be *illegitimate* according to some fundamental *norms*, for instance those of international human and social rights. At the same time, critical analysis should be aware of the fact that such norms and rights change historically, and that some definitions of 'international' may well mean 'Western'. As a criterion, we thus call any discourse unjust if it violates the internationally recognized human rights of people and contributes to social inequality. Typical examples are discourses that ultimately (re)produce inequalities of gender, race or class.

Finally, socially committed research should be carried out in close collaboration and solidarity with those who need it most, such as various dominated groups in society. This also means, not least for students, that CDS research and especially its practical applications should be accessible, and avoid an esoteric style. In that and many other senses, CDS researchers are profoundly aware of the role of scholarly activities in society.

What are Critical Discourse Studies (CDS)?

Although it is virtually impossible to briefly and adequately define a type of scholarly investigation, critical studies of discourse typically have the following properties:

- They aim to analyse, and thus to contribute to the understanding and the solution of, serious social problems, especially those that are caused or exacerbated by public text and talk, such as various forms of social power abuse (domination) and their resulting social inequality.

- This analysis is conducted within a normative perspective, defined in terms of international human rights, that allows a critical assessment of abusive, discursive practices as well as guidelines for practical intervention and resistance against illegitimate domination.
- The analysis specifically takes into account the interests, the expertise and the resistance of those groups that are the victims of discursive injustice and its consequences.

The discourse–cognition–society triangle

It is within this framework that I propose to formulate and illustrate some of the principles I try to observe when doing CDS. Given my multidisciplinary orientation, the overall label I sometimes use for my approach is that of ‘sociocognitive’ discourse analysis. Although I dislike labels (because they are reductionist and because I have many times changed my area and perspective of research), I have few quarrels with this one, especially since it emphasizes that – unlike many of my colleagues in CDS and various interactionist approaches – I value the fundamental importance of the study of *cognition* (and not only that of society) in the critical analysis of discourse, communication and interaction.

This means, among other things, that I am also interested in the study of mental representations and the processes of language users when they produce and comprehend discourse and participate in verbal interaction, as well as in the knowledge, ideologies and other beliefs shared by social groups. At the same time, such an approach examines the ways in which such cognitive phenomena are related to the structures of discourse, verbal interaction, communicative events and situations, as well as societal structures, such as those of domination and social inequality, as mentioned above.

What is ‘cognition’?

As is the case for other fundamental notions, ‘cognition’ is a notion that is jointly defined by all the disciplines currently integrated under the label ‘cognitive science’, such as psychology, linguistics, philosophy and logic as well as the brain sciences. Some typical cognitive notions used here are, for instance:

- **Mind**, defined, for example, as a central function of the human brain.
- **Cognition** as the set of functions of the mind, such as thought, perception and representation.
- **Memory**: Short Term (Working) Memory (STM) and Long Term Memory (LTM).
- **Episodic** (personal, autobiographic) **Memory** (EM) and **Semantic** (sociocultural, shared) **Memory** – as part of LTM.

- Semantic **Mental Models** (represented in EM) as the subjective representations of the events and situations observed, participated in or referred to by discourse.
- **Goals** as mental models of the situations to be realized by action.
- Pragmatic **Context Models**: specific mental models of subjective representations (definitions) of the relevant properties of communicative situations, controlling discourse processing and adapting discourse to the social environment so that it is situationally appropriate.
- **Knowledge** and its organization: shared, sociocultural **beliefs** that are certified by the (knowledge) criteria or standards of a (knowledge) community.
- **Ideology** as the shared, fundamental and axiomatic beliefs of specific social groups (socialism, neoliberalism, feminism, (anti)racism, pacifism, etc.).
- **Attitudes** as the socially shared, ideologically based opinions (normative beliefs) about specific social issues having given rise to debate or struggle (abortion, divorce, euthanasia, immigration, etc.).
- **Cognitive processes** such as the production and comprehension of discourse/ interaction on the basis of specific mental models, controlled by context models, and based on knowledge and ideologies.

The label of the ‘sociocognitive’ approach does not mean that I think that CDS should be *limited* to the social and cognitive study of discourse, or to some combination of these dimensions. It only means that (at present) I am personally most interested in the fascinating sociocognitive interface of discourse, that is, the relations between mind, discursive interaction and society. For instance, in my work on racism (Van Dijk, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993a, 2005, 2007b), and in my research on ideology (Van Dijk, 1998) and context (Van Dijk, 2008a, 2009), I have shown that these are *both* mental *and* social phenomena. It goes without saying, however, that the complex, ‘real-world’ problems CDS deals with also need a historical, cultural, socio-economic, philosophical, logical or neurological approach, among others, depending on what one wants to know (see, for instance, the various approaches represented in Van Dijk, 1997, 2007a).

Given the verbal–symbolic nature of discourse, explicit CDS of course also needs a solid ‘linguistic’ basis, where ‘linguistic’ is understood in a broad sense. Whatever cognitive and social dimensions of discourse CDS deals with, it always needs to account for at least some of the detailed structures, strategies and functions of *text* or *talk*. These may include grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narrative, argumentative or similar forms and meanings of the verbal, paraverbal and multimodal structures of communicative events.

Having emphasized the necessity of a broad, diverse, multidisciplinary and problem-oriented CDS, I thus limit my own endeavours to the domain defined by the discourse–cognition–society triangle.

In a more or less informal way, we may view the combined cognitive and social dimensions of the triangle as defining the relevant (local and global) *context* of discourse. Indeed, the sociopolitical and problem-oriented objectives of

CDS especially need sophisticated theorization of the intricate relationships between text and context. We shall see that adequate discourse analysis at the same time requires detailed cognitive and social analysis, and vice versa, and that it is only the *integration* of these accounts that may reach descriptive, explanatory and especially critical adequacy in the study of social problems.

It should be emphasized that context, as I define it, is not simply some kind of social environment, situation or structure – such as the social ‘variables’ of gender, age or ‘race’ in classical sociolinguistics. Rather, a context is a subjective mental representation, a dynamic online model, of the participants about the for–them–now relative properties of the communicative situation. I call such a representation a *context model* (Van Dijk, 2008a, 2009). It is this mental ‘definition of the situation’ that controls the adequate adaptation of discourse production and comprehension to their social environment. This is just one of the ways in which cognition, society and discourse are deeply and mutually integrated in interaction.

Within the theoretical framework of the discourse–cognition–society triangle, context models mediate between discourse structures and social structures at all levels of analysis. This means that ‘society’ is understood here as a complex configuration of situational structures at the local level (participants and their identities, roles and relationships engaging in spatiotemporally and institutionally situated, goal–direction interaction), on the one hand, and societal structures (organizations, groups, classes, etc. and their properties and – e.g. power – relations), on the other hand. This side of the triangle also includes the cultural and historical dimensions of interaction and social structure, that is, their cultural variation as well as their historical specificity and change. It is also at this side of the triangle that we locate the consequences of discursive injustice, for instance in the form of social inequality.

Finally, it should be stressed that the use of the triangle is merely an analytical metaphor representing the major dimensions of critical analysis. It should *not* be interpreted as suggesting that cognition and discourse are *outside* society. On the contrary, human beings as language users and as members of groups and communities, as well as their mental representations and discourses, are obviously an inherent part of society. It is also within social structure that language users interpret, represent, reproduce or change social structures such as social inequality and injustice.

What is ‘discourse’?

Discourse analysts are often asked to define the concept of ‘discourse’. Such a definition would have to consist of the whole discipline of discourse studies, in the same way as linguistics provides the many dimensions of the definition of ‘language’. In my view, it hardly makes sense to define fundamental notions such as ‘discourse’,

'language', 'cognition', 'interaction', 'power' or 'society'. To understand these notions, we need whole theories or disciplines of the objects or phenomena we are dealing with. Thus, discourse is a multidimensional social phenomenon. It is at the same time a linguistic (verbal, grammatical) object (meaningful sequences or words or sentences), an action (such as an assertion or a threat), a form of social interaction (like a conversation), a social practice (such as a lecture), a mental representation (a meaning, a mental model, an opinion, knowledge), an interactional or communicative event or activity (like a parliamentary debate), a cultural product (like a telenovela) or even an economic commodity that is being sold and bought (like a novel). In other words, a more or less complete 'definition' of the notion of discourse would involve many dimensions and consists of many other fundamental notions that need definition, that is, theory, such as meaning, interaction and cognition.

The example: the defense of capitalism

After a discussion of some of the general notions of CDS, I shall now be more specific about the kind of discourse structures to be attended to in such a critical approach. At the same time, I shall illustrate and further develop the theoretical notions introduced above by analysing some properties of a specific example: a text – 'A Petition Against the Persecution of Microsoft' of the Center for the Moral Defense of Capitalism (now called Center for the Advancement of Capitalism) – downloaded from the internet in 2001 (www.moraldefense.com) (text no longer available on the website in 2008). This petition criticizes the US government for its legal battle against Microsoft, and asks readers to sign it.

I have chosen this text as an example because of the widely perceived socio-economic problem that vast international corporations may abuse their power in order to dominate the market and hence limit the freedom of choice of consumers.

Context

Of the communicative situation of this, we do not know much more than that the text was found on the internet in 2000, and that it was produced by the *Center for the Moral Defense of Capitalism*, whose very name suggests a neoliberal, conservative think tank. A new internet search in December 2007 presented the following definition of the goals of the Center:

The Center for the Advancement of Capitalism is dedicated to advancing individual rights and economic freedom through Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. (www.moraldefense.com)

This means that readers who know this Center may already have a more detailed context model of the communicative situation than other readers

(such as information about the ideological background, identity and goals of the Center), and can interpret the text in that light. Intended recipients are people who use the web and understand English. A further aspect of the communicative situation is the assumed *previous knowledge* about legal actions against Microsoft because of its abuse of market power (a near monopoly, because of the pervasive use of Windows as an operating system for PCs) to couple other programs (such as its web browser Explorer) to this operating system. In other words, the context analysis focuses on Setting (Time, Place), Participants and their properties and relations, as well as on their Goals, the Knowledge presupposed by the participants, and the Ideology of the participants.

Topics: semantic macrostructures

I often advocate beginning Critical Analysis (CrA) with an analysis of semantic macrostructures, that is, with a study of global meanings, topics or themes. These are what discourses are (globally) about; they are mostly intentional and consciously controlled by the speaker; they embody the (subjectively) most important information of a discourse, express the overall ‘content’ of mental models of events (see below), and perhaps most importantly, they represent the meaning or information most readers will memorize best of a discourse. Discursively, topics or themes are characteristically expressed in titles, abstracts, summaries and announcements.

For contextual reasons, we select topics as a significant structure to study because they are usually controlled by powerful speakers, because they influence many other structures of a discourse (such as its global coherence), and because they have the most obvious effects on the (memory and consequent actions of) recipients and hence on the process of reproduction that underlies social power and dominance (for details, see Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

In our sample text, the title, ‘A Petition Against the Persecution of Microsoft’ expresses not only part of the topic (‘the persecution of Microsoft’), but also the self-categorization of the text genre (‘petition’). Theoretically and psychologically, topics or macrostructures are derived from a text by inference – through a process of information reduction that is being practised especially in text summarization. Thus, we may ‘summarize’ this text by, for example, the following macropropositions:

- M1 The freedom of enterprise is under attack by antitrust laws.
- M2 Successful businessmen are being represented as tyrants.
- M3 The suit against Microsoft is an example of this M1 and M2.
- M4 Government should not limit the freedom of the market.
- M5 Microsoft has the right to do what it wants with its products.
- M6 Innovators should not be punished.
- M7 We call that the case against Microsoft be dismissed.

In a further reduction, one can summarize these macropropositions with the overall macroproposition (topic): 'The US government is requested to stop its judicial persecution of the innovator Microsoft.'

We see that these various topics/macropropositions indeed represent very high level, sometimes abstract, principles. In this case, these propositions are more or less a direct expression of some tenets of a classical capitalist ideology about the freedom of enterprise. In other words, the macropropositions express the general ideological principles of the freedom of the market, and then apply these to the special case of Microsoft. We shall see later that this distinction reflects the difference between socially shared representations, on the one hand, and more personal mental models, on the other.

Local meanings

Next, a CrA may focus on local meanings, such as the meaning of words (a study that also may be called lexical, depending on one's perspective), the structures and nature of propositions, and coherence and other relations between propositions, such as implications, presuppositions, levels of description, degrees of granularity and so on.

The reasons to give priority to semantic analysis in CrA are mostly contextual: local meanings are a function of the selection made by speakers/writers in their mental models of events or their more general knowledge and ideologies. At the same time, they are the kind of information that (under the overall control of global topics) most directly influences the mental models, and hence the opinions and attitudes of recipients. Together with the topics, these meanings are best recalled and reproduced by recipients, and hence may have the most obvious social consequences.

As is the case for many variable structures of discourse, local meanings may also be *controlled by context models*. That is, not all local meanings are equally appropriate in communicative situations, as we know from the general distinction between formal, casual and popular discourse styles, as well as from social and cultural taboos. Indeed, most institutional text and talk is contextually constrained by the specific aims and norms of institutional interaction and organization.

Theoretically, this means that the generation of meanings based on mental models of events talked about is controlled by the various categories and contents of context models. One obvious controlling mechanism is that the mutual *knowledge* as indexed by the context model requires that speakers ongoingly in principle only assert what the recipients do not already know, as we also know from the appropriateness conditions of the speech act of an assertion. Other constraints are defined for specific kinds of *participants* and their identities, roles and relationship: there are often limitations of 'content' or meaning for specific categories of speakers, and this is especially so in institutional situations.

At this local semantic level, we may for instance examine the choice of the word 'persecution' in the title of our sample text, a choice that has various implications that express the ideological perspective of the author (The Center for the Moral Defense of Capitalism): the action of the government is defined in negative terms, implying a form of morally or legally reprehensible harassment or force, or abuse of power. At the same time, the choice of this word implies that Microsoft is the victim of this aggression. In more general terms, lexical selection here shows the familiar form of negative other-presentation, and positive self-presentation as an organization taking the defence of the victims. As part of the main macroproposition, the choice of the concept of 'persecution' also contributes to the organization of the local meanings in the rest of the text. In more cognitive terms, this means that the choice of this word may influence the formation of the macronodes of the mental model of the readers of this text.

Similarly relevant is the repeated use of the word 'rights' in the first paragraph, typically associated with 'individual' and 'freedom', all profoundly ideological concepts related to the constitution and prevailing ideology of the United States. In order to be able to qualify the legal action of the government in the starkly negative terms of a 'persecution', it needs to be shown that the rights of individuals are being violated, and what these rights are. The emphasis on rights has several other functions, such as associating Us and Our position with something good and legitimate, and thus preparing the negative evaluation of the US Government when it violates these rights. Apart from polarizing the mental model being construed here, this paragraph at the same time functions as an important premise in the overall argumentation of this text.

For CDS, especially interesting in such a local semantic analysis is the study of the many forms of implicit or indirect meanings, such as implications, presuppositions, allusions, vagueness and so on. Again, such meanings are related to underlying beliefs, but not openly, directly or precisely asserted for various contextual reasons, including the well-known ideological objective to de-emphasize Our bad things and Their good things.

In our sample text, there are many propositions that are implied or presupposed, but not explicitly asserted. When the authors say that antitrust legislation comes 'under the guise of "protecting the public"', the expression 'under the guise' and the quotes imply that it is not true (or merely alleged) that antitrust laws protect the public. Note also that in the second paragraph, as well as throughout the text, many expressions have ideological presuppositions, such as:

- competitors are envious of successful business men
- officials are power-hungry
- the business world has creative geniuses
- business empires are hard-won.

Apart from further emphasizing the polarization between Government and Business, the local meanings of the text thus create another polarization between envious competitors and brilliant creators in the business. Notice also that the lexical choice and metaphors further emphasize these polarizations: envious,

power-hungry, hard-won, control, regulators, and breaking to pieces, etc. are the negative concepts associated with Them, the government (and some business people), whereas We and those we protect are associated with success, creative geniuses and by litotes with 'crime' and 'tyrant'. Again, such words not only contribute to the overall polarization of the conceptual structure of the text, but also to the formation of a biased, polarized model of the events, where the Actors are neatly differentiated between the Good and the Bad.

The first two paragraphs are formulated in general terms, and apply to rights and their violation, as well as to the antitrust laws. The third paragraph begins with the functional move of Specification or Example: what has been said so far specifically applies to the case of Microsoft. Theoretically, this means that the first paragraphs are rather expressions of (general) social representations, such as attitudes and ideologies, whereas the third paragraph describes the current case, Microsoft, and thus sets up the more specific mental model based on these general social representations. Given the ideological slant of the first paragraphs, there is little doubt that this model, as expressed by the Center, is also ideologically biased, and we may expect that the general polarization constructed before will be applied here, as is indeed the case. Notice also that conceptual polarization is often implemented in the text by various forms of hyperboles, as we have already seen in the lexical choice of 'crime', 'tyrants' and 'geniuses'. Such hyperboles may even come close to outright lies, for instance when it is asserted that Bill Gates has been deprived of his right to control his own company.

The use of 'his', 'businessmen' and 'the men who have made this country great' suggests that men, especially or exclusively and no women, are involved in business and its success. Thus, apart from expressing a starkly conservative neo-liberal ideology, the Center also professes a sexist ideology by verbally excluding women, thus contributing to a more overall conservative meta-ideology that also controls the nationalist ideology expressed in the characteristic form of US self-glorification (the 'greatness' of this country).

Finally, among the many other semantic properties of this text, we should also mention the importance of what is being left out in the text. Thus, it is suggested that the success of Microsoft is based on the principle of better products for a lower price, but of course not the well-known practice of the forced bundling of products (like Windows and its internet browser). Nearly trivially then, we may formulate the general rule that the negative properties of Us (or those we defend) are either omitted or downgraded in the text. Note that, theoretically, omission is only a relevant property of a discourse when it can be shown that the omitted information is part of the mental model (the Center no doubt knows about the illegal practices of Microsoft), or of more general, shared knowledge that is needed or may be used to produce or understand a text. In this case, the mental model of a critical reader may of course be different from that persuasively expressed by the Center.

We now have a first impression of the theoretically based practical guidelines on which discourse structures to study among many hundreds. Of course, this is only an example. The point is that such a choice is twice context-bound: first, by our own (scholarly) aims, our research problems, and the expectations of our readers, as well as the social relevance of our research project. Second, by the relevance of specific discourse structures studied in their own context, such as the aims and beliefs of the speaker or the recipients, the social roles, positions and relations of participants, institutional constraints and so on.

The relevance of subtle 'formal' structures

Besides or instead of the semantic structures just mentioned, we may be more interested in those structures of text or talk that are usually less consciously controlled or controllable by the speakers, such as intonation, syntactic structures, propositional structures, and rhetorical figures, as well as the many properties of spontaneous talk, such as turn-taking, repairs, pauses, hesitation, and so on.

These various 'forms' generally do not directly express the underlying meanings and hence beliefs, but rather signal the 'pragmatic' properties of a communicative event, such as the intention, current mood or emotions of speakers, their perspective on the events talked about, their opinions of co-participants, and interactional concerns especially such as positive self-presentation and impression formation. Thus, men may well be able to hide their negative opinions of women, or white people of black people, but indirectly their evaluations, position or face, and hence their identity, may be signalled by subtle structural or formal characteristics of talk or the non-verbal properties of communicative events (gestures, face work, body position, distance, and so on).

At both the global and local levels, our sample text also has several formal properties that enhance the general underlying topic and argumentation. Indeed, as we have seen, the very argumentative structure of this petition is one of the global, formal properties that organizes this text: the general premises, expressed in the first two paragraphs, focus on constitutional rights on the one hand, and the alleged violation of such rights by the antitrust laws on the other. Both are then applied to the more particular premise that Microsoft is the victim of this violation. In the same way, several of the meanings in these and other paragraphs have specific argumentative functions, such as the reference to the Declaration of Independence as an authoritative and hence credible set of principles by which the government's duties are evaluated.

Similarly, the discourse may enhance its effectiveness by various rhetorical moves, of which hyperboles have already been mentioned ('geniuses', etc.). There is also the use of the opposite of what is being meant, for instance in irony or litotes (such as the Microsoft 'crime' of being successful).

Indeed, the very structure of polarization of this kind of ideological discourse not only has a semantic property, but also formal properties, such as the rhetorical contrast expressed in the fourth paragraph: here, the government's views that the 'free' market imposes 'force', and that 'control' is 'freedom', are criticized as an inversion of reality as the Center sees it, and it does so by a construction of a contrast.

Finally, in the same way that the semantic and rhetorical polarizations of this text express and help construct biased models of the case against Microsoft, its formal style is a marker of its genre: the official petition. This formal style begins with the paraphrase of the Declaration of Independence, but is also lexically expressed in the Center's own petition, as in the repeated 'We hold that ...', 'not by anyone's permission, but by absolute right', etc., signalling something like a Declaration of the Free Market.

One conclusion of this discussion of the criteria applied in the choice of the discourse structures studied in CDS projects is that any 'method' or 'approach' that limits itself to some genre or dimension of discourse only can by definition only provide a very partial analysis. Trivially, grammarians usually study grammar, conversation analysts conversations, and narratologists stories and their structures. Now, if some CDS researcher, for the double contextual reasons explained above, precisely needs to study some aspects of grammar, conversation or narration, it is obviously in these more specific areas of research that one looks for relevant structures. But as soon as the 'critical' aims of the research project require a broader approach, those scholars who limit themselves to the study of a single genre or types of structure are often unable to fully deploy their expertise. Hence also my oft-repeated criticism of the exclusive membership of one school, approach or scholarly sect, and my plea for diversity, flexibility and multidisciplinary as general criteria for CDS. This obviously first of all applies to CDS and critical scholars themselves! Indeed, there are many ways to do interesting and relevant discourse analysis, and we also need to develop the more general theories, concepts and methods that may (also) be used in critical analysis. Indeed, few of the general notions used so far in our analysis were developed within critical studies.

Relating text and context: context models

It has been assumed above that the relation between discourse and society is not direct, but needs to be *mediated* by so-called *context models* (Van Dijk, 2008a, 2009). That is, social structures – organizations, groups, gender, race, etc. – are phenomena that cannot be directly linked to the mental processes of discourse production and understanding, as was previously the case in traditional sociolinguistics.

Hence, we need a mediating *cognitive* device that is able to *represent* the relevant structures of the social situation, both locally (micro) as well as globally (macro), and that at the same time is able to *control* discourse, the mental processes of production and comprehension and its situated *variation*.

Context models, defined as specific mental models, represented in episodic memory, do just that. They make sure that language users adapt their discourse to the social environment, so that it is socially *appropriate*.

Given more or less the same 'content' or 'information' as specified as the (semantic) mental model of things talked about, context models are needed to appropriately formulate more or less the 'same' content in different communicative situations. This means that context models define the *genre* as well as the *style* of text and talk.

As summarized above, context models are organized by a relatively simple *schema* consisting of fundamental *categories*, such as:

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- a spatiotemporal setting
- participants
 - identities, roles, relationships
 - goals
 - knowledge
 - ideologies
- the ongoing social action.

Context models are dynamic and are ongoingly adapted to the communicative situation, if only because the knowledge of the recipients is constantly changing as a result of the very discourse itself.

Since context models control all the variable aspects of discourse (intonation, syntax, lexicon, etc.), they need to be kept activated at least in the background of working memory – and hence cannot be too complex or voluminous (and represent dozens or hundreds of aspects of the current communicative situation).

It goes without saying that context models as a crucial interface between discourse and society also play a fundamental role in critical discourse studies, which are premised on the detailed analysis of some of these discourse–society relationships, such as those of power and domination.

In our example of a petition, the context defining the communicative event is rather obvious. The overall societal domain for this text is that of business or the market, and the overall actions are those of advocating the freedom of enterprise, and protecting business against government interference. The local setting of the communicative event is the internet. The communicative role of the participant is that of speaker/writer, author and originator, the interactional role that of a defender of Microsoft and as an opponent of the government, whereas the socio-economic role is that of an organization advocating the freedom of the market. The other participant, the addressee, is explicitly referred to in the beginning of the text as ‘Fellow Americans’, thus pragmatically trying to emphasize the unity of the ‘we’ group for which this Center claims to be the defender. It is interesting that although the proposal for the petition is directed at ‘Fellow Americans’, the proposed petition itself is addressed to the relevant final destinaries: the judge, the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Attorney General and the President of the United States.

The current communicative action is that of publishing a text on the internet persuading readers to sign a petition. This action is being performed through the speech acts of accusing the government, and defending Microsoft. The (complex) mental structures defining the cognitive dimension of the context consist of the various ideologies analysed above, as well as the more specific attitudes and opinions (about the legal action of the government against Microsoft) we have found expressed throughout the text. Although expressing group co-membership in addressing ‘Fellow Americans’, the persuasive structure of the text presupposes that not all Americans may have the same opinion about the practices of Microsoft. Finally, the text is meaningful for its readers only because it presupposes a vast amount

of common ground and commonsense knowledge, such as about the Declaration of Independence, Microsoft, antitrust laws and so on, as well as specific (model-based) knowledge about the current court case against Microsoft.

The important point is that throughout, the text adapts to this subjectively construed context model of the current communicative situation, for example, as follows:

- The meanings of the text are all understandable within the broader framework of the three semantic domains of business, justice and government.
- The genre and speech act of the petition is one form of implementing the overall defence of the free market, which is the global aim of the Center.
- The action of the government is defined as a violation of Our rights, and hence is a sufficient condition for the success of the current genre and speech act of a petition.
- The overall topic semantically realizes the reason for the speech act and genre of this specific petition: Microsoft's rights have been violated.
- The argumentative structure is organized in such a way as to optimally sustain the communicative function of this text as a form of persuasion.
- The polarization of the opinions at all levels of the text expresses the attitudes and the ideology of the Center, and tries to influence those of the readers – and final destinataries.
- Lexical choice is appropriate for the genre of a formal, public petition.
- The text presupposes existent general knowledge about what business, laws, governments, etc. are, as well as specific knowledge about the process against Microsoft. However, it does not express or presuppose knowledge that debilitates its defence (e.g. about the illegal practices of Microsoft).

For any kind of CDS research that links text with some social situation, it is important to realize that whatever the broader social or political situation, it may not 'reach' or impact on discourse simply because a speaker may find it irrelevant and further ignores the relevant information in the construction of the context model. Also, the changes that speakers apply in their discourses, for example, because of politeness or other forms of persuasion, need to be taken into account.

We see that the notion of subjective context models theoretically implies the important criterion of *relevance*, namely that only those properties of communicative situation are construed as forming part of the context, if they are (now) relevant for the participant. Note that relevance is not absolute or (only) socially determined, but is relative to the current knowledge, goals, wishes, interests and personal experiences of the current speaker or recipient at each moment of a communicative event.

Discourse semantics: event models

Crucial to any theory of discourse is its semantics, which provides a theory of discourse meaning and interpretation. Traditionally, a linguistic semantics is

formulated in terms of abstract meanings: concepts, propositions and their mutual relations. Thus, local coherence of discourse is defined as constraints on relations between propositions, on the one hand, and on the relations between the referents ('facts' of some mental model) of such propositions, on the other hand. For instance, a sequence of propositions may be said to be coherent if the facts (states of affairs, events, actions, etc.) referred to by these propositions are related, for instance by relations of causality or more generally by relations of conditionality (such as enabling). We may call this *referential* or *extensional coherence*. On the other hand, coherence may also be established by intentional (meaning) relations among the propositions themselves, for instance when a proposition *Q* is a Generalization, Specification, Example, Illustration, etc. of a previous proposition *P*. Since *Q* is defined here in terms of its function relative to *P*, we may call this *functional coherence*.

As suggested, such an account is rather abstract, and appears to have little empirical relevance: this is not the way language users go about producing and understanding meaningful discourse. Instead of an abstract theory of meaning, therefore, we may define meaning and interpretation in cognitive terms, that is, in terms of mental operations and representations.

Such an approach also solves a major problem of the more formal account, namely the nature of reference: notions that define referential coherence, such as referents, facts and causal relations between facts, are not defined in linguistic (grammatical) semantics. A cognitive approach to discourse meaning not only may solve that problem, but at the same time accounts for the subjectivity of coherence: discourses are not coherent in the abstract, but are coherent for language users, and according to their intentions, interpretations or understandings.

Thus, discourses are not so much coherent because their propositions refer to related 'objective' facts in some possible world, but rather to the episodes (events and situations) as interpreted, defined and (seen to be) related by language users. We have seen above that such subjective interpretations are represented in episodic memory as *mental models* of events and situations. We may now simply say that a discourse is coherent if language users are able to construct a mental model for it. We may call these models *event models* in order to account for the fact that they subjectively represent the events the discourse refers to. Whereas context models, as discussed above, are pragmatic, event models are *semantic*.

Since context models are a specific kind of event model (namely a model of communicative events), event models have more or less the same structure organized by a *schema* with *categories* such as Setting, Participants and Actions/Events – and their respective subcategories and properties.

Thus, in the analysis of our example, we have repeatedly seen how at all levels of the petition text, structures are geared not only to the adequate expression of the mental model of the (authors in the) Center for the Moral Defense of Capitalism, but also to the persuasive construction of a preferred model among the addressees. That

is, this intended model features the macro-opinion that the US Government through its antitrust laws in general, and its case against Microsoft in particular, violates the basic principles of the freedom of the market. That is, the current mental model of the Microsoft case is a fairly direct instantiation of more general attitudes about antitrust legislation and their basic ideologies about the freedom of enterprise. The polarization between Us and Them, or between Business and Government, and its respective Good and Bad qualities, is thus a specification of more general opinions about ingroups and outgroups as we know them from the study of ideology (Van Dijk, 1998). In other words, the authors of the text not only try to adequately express their own model of the events, but formulate the text in such a way that the intended model be accepted by the readers. This is what persuasion is all about, and it may be obvious that without an account of mental model structures, such a verbal act and its concomitant verbal structures cannot be adequately described, let alone explained.

The notion of a mental model also explains another fundamental property of discourse meaning: its *incompleteness*. Semantically speaking, a discourse is like the tip of an iceberg: only some of the propositions needed to understand a discourse are actually expressed; most other propositions remain *implicit*, and must be inferred from the *explicit* propositions (given a body of world knowledge, to which we shall come back below). It is the model that provides these 'missing propositions'. Implicit or implied propositions of discourse are thus simply defined as those propositions that are part of the mental model for that discourse, but not present in its semantic representation. That is, for pragmatic reasons as defined by the context model of a discourse (including the beliefs attributed to the recipient by the speaker), only part of the propositions of a model need to be expressed – for instance, because the speaker believes that such information is irrelevant, because the recipient already knows these propositions, or because it may be inferred from other propositions. Hence, mental models at the same time provide an excellent definition of presuppositions, namely as those propositions of event models that are implied but not asserted by the discourse.

Besides discourse coherence and implications, the notion of event models provides a framework for many other, hitherto problematic, aspects of discourse and discourse processing, briefly summarized as follows:

- Event models are a crucial cognitive aspect of the *constructionist* way people view, understand, interpret and recall 'reality'. In other words, our personal *experiences*, as represented in episodic memory, consist of mental constructs: models.
- Event models are not only the result of discourse comprehension, but are also the basis of discourse *production*. Event models may be part of our planning of discourse ('what we want to say'). Thus, stories are contextually appropriate (relevant, interesting) formulations of underlying event models, for instance of personal experiences as stored in episodic memory.
- Event models are *subjective* (personal interpretations of events), but have a *social* basis, because they instantiate socially shared knowledge and possibly also group ideologies (see below). That is, context models explain how discourse

may be ideologically 'biased', namely when based on event models that instantiate ideological propositions.

- Event models account for the fact that different language users, members of different communities and of different social (e.g. ideological) groups, may have *different interpretations* of events, and at the same time, different interpretations of the same discourse. This implies that the *influence* of discourse on the minds of recipients may also be different.

Social cognition

CDS is not primarily interested in the subjective meanings or experiences of individual language users. Power, power abuse, dominance and their reproduction typically involve collectivities, such as groups, social movements, organizations and institutions (Van Dijk, 2008b).

Therefore, besides the fundamental interface of personal mental models that account for *specific* discourses, a cognitive approach also needs to account for *social cognition*, that is, the beliefs or *social representations* they share with others of their group or community. Knowledge, attitudes, values, norms and ideologies are different types of social representations.

These social representations also play a role in the construction of personal models, as we have seen in some detail in our brief analytical remarks about the Petition text. That is, socially shared knowledge and opinions may be 'instantiated' in such models. In other words, models are also the interface of the individual and the social, and explain how group beliefs may affect personal beliefs and thus be expressed in discourse. Ethnic or gender prejudice, which are typically defined for social groups, thus also appear as an (instantiated) property of individual discourses. And conversely, if the personal mental model of social events of an influential person is shared by others of a group or community, mental models may be generalized and abstracted from to form social representations such as knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. This is of course precisely the aim of the Petition text.

It is one of the aims of CDS research to analyse specific discourses in this broader, social framework, for instance by trying to infer (sometimes quite indirectly) which shared social representations are being expressed or presupposed by discourse. Thus, critical discourse studies of racism, sexism or classism need to relate properties of discourse with these underlying, socially shared, representations, which group members use as a resource to talk about (members) of other groups. *Outgroup derogation* and *ingroup celebration* are the social-psychological strategies typically defining this kind of chauvinist discourse.

Ideology

Dominance, defined as power abuse, is often based on, and legitimated by ideologies, that is, by the fundamental social beliefs that organize and control the

social representations of groups and their members. Many forms of CDS research require such an ideological analysis, especially because ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced by discourse.

It is important to stress here that the cognitive framework sketched above suggests that *there is no direct link between discourse and ideology*. The basic beliefs of an ideology (for instance, about the equality of women and men in a feminist ideology) organize specific attitudes, that is, the socially shared opinions of a group (for instance, about abortion, sexual harassment or equal pay), which in turn may influence specific event models (about specific participants and actions), which finally may be related to discourse under the final control of context models. In other words, to 'read off' ideologies from discourse is not always possible, precisely because ideologies need to be very general and fairly abstract. Although we still ignore what the general structure of ideologies are (van Dijk, 1998), it may be assumed that they are organized by a *general schema* consisting of the basic categories that organize the self and other representations of a group and its members, such as:

- membership devices (how does it belong to us?)
- typical acts (what do we do?)
- aims (why do we do it?)
- relations with other (opponent) groups
- resources, including access to public discourse.

Note that many of the features that were traditionally examined in the (critical or other) analysis of discourse are here accounted for in more explicit, separate theories of cognition. That is, meaningfulness, interpretation and understanding of text and context are described here in terms of specific mental representations, such as event models, context models and social representations. We are thus able not only to abstractly *describe* text and talk, but also to *explain* how real language users go about producing and understanding discourse, how their personal and socially shared beliefs affect discourse production and how these are in turn affected by discourse. No critical account of discourse is theoretically complete without such a cognitive interface.

Social situations

We shall be relatively brief about the third main component of our CDS approach: society. For obvious reasons, the social dimensions of CDS usually receive more attention from CDS researchers than its cognitive aspects, as is also shown in the other chapters in this book. Note though that our sociocognitive theory explains how social structures may affect (and be affected by) discourse structures via a theory of social cognition.

An account of the role of social structures in CDS requires an analysis of both micro (local) and macro (global) structures of society, that is, of individual social actors and their situated interactions, on the one hand, and of social groups, movements, organizations and institutions, as well as their relations, such as power and dominance, on the other hand.

Note that the micro–macro distinction is only analytic. In real life, social members may experience and interpret such structures at the same time: by ‘locally’ responding to a question from a student, which may be part of the somewhat more comprehensive social activity of giving a class, I at the same time may teach a course and reproduce the organization of this university as well as higher education – at increasingly ‘higher’, macro and abstract levels of analysis and (diminishing degrees of) awareness.

Unlike, for instance, therapists, CDS scholars are less interested in the account of specific discourses, interactions and situations – such as, indeed, the example analysed in this chapter. Rather, they focus on the more general ways specific discourses may be *instances* of more general discourse properties and how such discourse may contribute to social inequality, for instance by the formation of biased models and ultimately by the formation or confirmation of ideologies.

Micro vs. macro

As is the case for micro sociologists, discourse analysts deal primarily with text and talk, and hence with a typical ‘micro’ dimension of society. Indeed, it is generally assumed that society and its structures – as well as its structures of inequality – are ‘locally’ produced by its members. Yet, I additionally assume that *such local production in interaction is possible only if members have shared social representations such as knowledge and ideologies*. In that sense, ‘local’ social interaction is again ‘enabled’ by a macro dimension such as the social cognitions of collectivities. But then again, such a macro dimension is itself constructed cognitively by the mental representations of groups of individual social actors. We thus see how for CDS, the micro and macro dimensions of society, and their analysis, are multiply integrated, as is also embodied in the slogan that CDS is mainly interested in the *discursive* reproduction of the *social structure* of inequality. One of the reasons CDS research (critically) analyses specific discourses is the methodologically important fact that these are more directly analysable than abstract structures, and that abstract structures can only be inferred (as language users do) by studying special cases. Although the macrosocial dimensions of society (such as social inequality) will usually be the main reasons and aims of CDS, we can only observe and analyse such abstract structures in terms of how they are expressed or enacted locally in social practices in general, and in discourses in particular, that is, in specific situations.

As part of an analysis of social situations, let me briefly say a few words about two central categories of social situations: *action* and *actors*.

Discursive action as social–political action

In a similar way as the abstract meanings of discourse are intricately related to beliefs and other cognitive representations, the discursive acts accomplished in or by discourse can also hardly be separated from the social acts that define social situations: discourse is inherently part of both cognition and situations. Indeed, discursive acts are by definition also social acts. However, since not all social acts are discursive, we need more than just an analysis of speech acts, such as assertions, promises or threats, or typical discursive interactions such as turn-taking, interruptions, agreeing, or the opening and closing of a conversation. There are also a large number of social acts that are the conditions, consequences, or implications of discursive (verbal) interaction.

Thus, holding a speech in parliament may involve a sequence of speech acts such as assertions, questions, or accusations, as well as conversational moves and strategies such as responding to critique, agreeing with members of your own party, refusing to be interrupted, and many more. In this conversational aspect, parliamentary debates are not fundamentally different from other forms of public dialogue. However, what is typical and characteristic is that by such conversational moves, representing the voters, and other global political actions. Similarly, by speaking negatively about refugees in order to persuade parliament to enact tough legislation against immigrants, this at the same time implies the social act of derogation and discrimination. Even quite local moves, such as denials in disclaimers ('I have nothing against blacks, but ...') may be part of a larger social–psychological strategy of positive self-presentation (ingroup celebration) and outgroup derogation which is so typical of contemporary racisms, especially of the elite.

In other words, in CDS, the action–analysis of text and talk is not limited to a study of typically discursive doings but also examines the ways in which discursive acts and structures are deployed in the enactment of broader social and political acts, especially those that are part of systems of dominance (or resistance against dominance).

The same is true for the embedding of discursive interaction in broader social and political acts, and the study of the social conditions and consequences of discourse. Thus, an immigration debate in parliament presupposes the global acts of immigration, and may globally result in keeping refugees out, and even more locally it may be a consequence of a political act of government, for instance a decision to close the borders for a specific group of refugees.

Actors

Similar remarks hold for the actors that define situations as participants in various roles, such as communicative roles (various kinds of 'producers'

or 'recipients' of text or talk), social roles such as friends and enemies, occupational roles such as politicians, or political roles such as members of parliament or members of a party. Note that in the same way as an action may be defined at different levels, and thus relate discursive acts (such as denials) with social acts (such as discrimination), actors may also at the same time engage in various identities at the same time, although some identities or group affiliations will be stronger and more salient than others in a particular context. As we have emphasized before in the model theory of context, a relevant situational analysis of discourse does not abstractly examine all the possible identities of speakers or recipients, but only the locally relevant or more prominent ones, and how these affect or are affected by discourse.

Note that a local actor analysis of discourse situations at the same time involves an interface with societal structures: speakers act as members of various social groups, and we thus have an obvious link between the macrostructures of groups and the microstructures of interaction, namely via the relation of membership. A similar relationship was established in mental models, namely between personal beliefs and the socially shared beliefs of groups.

Societal structures

Local situations of interaction enact, manifest, or challenge global societal structures. Participants speak and listen as women, mothers, lawyers, party members, or company executives. Their actions, including their discursive actions, realize larger social acts and processes, such as legislation, education, discrimination and dominance, often within institutional frameworks such as parliaments, schools, families, or research institutes.

CDS is mainly interested in the role of discourse in the instantiation and reproduction of power and power abuse (dominance), and hence is particularly interested in the detailed study of the interface between the local and the global, between the structures of discourse and the structures of society. We have seen that such links are not direct, but need a cognitive and an interactional interface: social representations, including attitudes and ideologies, are often mediated by mental models in order to show up in discourse, and such discourse has social effects and functions only when it in turn contributes to the formation or confirmation of social attitudes and ideologies. White group dominance can only be 'implemented' when white group members actually engage in such derogating discourse as an instance of discrimination. Racism and sexism are thus not merely abstract systems of social inequality and dominance, but actually 'reach' down in the forms of everyday life, namely through the beliefs, actions and discourses of group members.

Similar remarks have been made in the analysis of our sample text. In order to fully understand and explain (the structures of) this text, we not only need to spell out its cognitive and contextual conditions and consequences, but also the broader societal structures on which such cognitions and contexts are ultimately based, and which at the same time they enable, sustain and reproduce. We have seen how throughout the text and at all levels, the negative opinion about the US Government in the Microsoft case is linked with the overall neo-liberal ideology of a free market, in which creative 'businessmen' are the heroes and the government (and its justice system) the enemies, against whose attacks the Center plays its specific role of 'defender' of capitalist values. That is, the ideology, as implemented in the mental models constructed for the Microsoft case and as more or less directly expressed in the text, needs to be linked to societal groups, organizations, structures and relationships of power. Indeed, the current text is in that respect just one of the myriad of (discursive and other) actions of the business community in its power struggle with the State. It is only at the highest level of societal analysis that we are able to fundamentally understand this text, its structures and functions.

It is this permanent bottom-up and top-down linkage of discourse and interaction with societal structures that forms one of the most typical characteristics of CDS. Discourse analysis is thus at the same time cognitive, social and political analysis, but focuses rather on the role discourses play, both locally and globally, in society and its structures.

The relevant relationships run both ways. Societal structures such as groups and institutions, as well as overall relations such as power or global societal acts such as legislation and education, provide the overall constraints on local actions and discourse. These constraints may be more or less strong, and run from strict norms and obligations (for instance, as formulated in law, such as the acts of judges or MPs), to more flexible or 'soft' norms, such as politeness norms.

These global constraints may affect such diverse discourse properties as interaction moves, who controls turn-taking or who opens a session, speech acts, topic choice, local coherence, lexical style or rhetorical figures. And conversely, these discourse structures may be 'heard as' (interpreted as, count as) actions that are instances or components of such very global societal or political acts as immigration policy or educational reform.

It is precisely in these macro-micro links that we encounter the crux for a critical discourse analysis. Merely observing and analysing social inequality at high levels of abstraction is an exercise for the social sciences – and a mere study of discourse grammar, semantics, speech acts or conversational moves, the general task of linguists, and discourse and conversation analysts. Social and political discourse analysis is specifically geared towards the detailed explanation of the relationship between the two along the lines sketched above.

FURTHER READING

Since the topics dealt with in this chapter would require a vast number of references, I have not made specific references in the text other than where I concretely refer to some of my earlier work, of which this chapter is a sample. Obviously, many of the notions dealt with in this chapter have been based on, or inspired by, the work of others. Thus, my ideas on CDS have been influenced by the many publications of the other scholars represented in this volume, and I may for the sake of space simply refer to their chapters for detailed references. For the other notions used in this chapter, see the following references and recommended readings:

- **Cognition, social cognition, memory, mental models, text processing:** Augoustinos and Walker (1995); Fiske and Taylor (1991); Graesser et al. (2003); Johnson-Laird (1983); Kintsch (1998); Moscovici (2000); Tulving (1983); Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983); Van Oostendorp and Goldman (1999).
- **Context:** Auer (1992); Duranti and Goodwin (1992); Gumperz (1982); Van Dijk (2008a, 2009).
- **Discourse and conversation structures:** Schiffrin et al. (2001); Ten Have (1999); van Dijk (1997; 2007a, 2007b).
- **Social situation analysis:** Argyle et al. (1981); Goffman (1970); Scherer and Giles (1979).
- **The analysis of social structure and its relations to discourse and cognition:** Alexander et al. (2004); Boden and Zimmerman (1991); Wuthnow (1989).
- **Discourse and ideology:** Van Dijk (1998).
- **Discourse and power:** Van Dijk (2008b).
- **Corporate and organizational discourse:** Grant et al. (2004).
- **Neoliberalism:** Rapley (2004).

Appendix

A Petition Against the Persecution of Microsoft

Sign the Petition – International Version (for non-US residents)

To: Members of Congress, Attorney General Janet Reno and President Bill Clinton.

Fellow Americans:

The Declaration of Independence proclaims that the government's fundamental purpose is to protect the rights of the individual, and that each individual has an inalienable right to the pursuit of happiness. Throughout America's

history, this noble idea has protected the individual's right to pursue his own happiness by applying his energy to productive work, trading the products of his effort on a free market and rising as far as his abilities carry him.

Over the past century, however, this freedom has been under attack, and one notorious avenue of this attack has been the antitrust laws. Under the guise of 'protecting the public,' these laws have allowed envious competitors and power-hungry officials to attack successful businessmen for the crime of being successful. It has led to the ugly spectacle of the creative geniuses of the business world – the men who have made this country great – being branded as oppressive tyrants, whose hard-won business empires must be broken to pieces and subjected to the control of government regulators.

The Justice Department's current suit against Microsoft is the latest example of this trend. It is based on envy for the productive ability of Microsoft and its founder, Bill Gates. The result of this suit, if successful, will be to deprive Mr. Gates of his right to control his own company, and to deprive the company of its ownership and control of its own products.

The Justice Department's case – and indeed the entire edifice of antitrust law – is based on the bizarrely inverted notion that the productive actions of individuals in the free market can somehow constitute 'force,' while the coercive actions of government regulators can somehow secure 'freedom.'

The truth is that the only kind of 'monopoly' that can form in a free market is one based on offering better products at lower prices, since under a free market even monopolies must obey the law of supply and demand. Harmful, coercive monopolies are the result, not of the operation of the free market, but of government regulations, subsidies, and privileges which close off entry to competitors. No business can outlaw its competitors – only the government can.

We hold that Microsoft has a right to its own property; that it has the authority, therefore, to bundle its properties – including Windows 95 and Internet Explorer – in whatever combination it chooses, not by anyone's permission, but by absolute right. We hold that to abridge this right is to attack every innovator's right to the products of his effort, and to overthrow the foundations of a free market and of a free society.

We do not want to live in a country where achievement is resented and attacked, where every innovator and entrepreneur has to fear persecution from dictatorial regulators and judges, enforcing undefined laws at the bidding of jealous competitors. We realize that our lives and well-being depend on the existence of a free market, in which innovators and entrepreneurs are free to rise as far as their ability can carry them, without being held down by arbitrary and unjust government regulations.

As concerned citizens, we ask that the Justice Department's case against Microsoft be dismissed. We call for a national debate over the arbitrary and

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unjust provisions of the antitrust laws and for an end to the practice of persecuting businessmen for their success.

Note

- 1 This text is a new, shorter and partly rewritten version of the author's contribution to Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds) (2002) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage, pp. 95-120.