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Opinions and ideologies in the press

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Abstract

Within the framework of a larger project on discourse and ideology, this paper examines the nature of opinions and how they are expressed in editorials in the press, using as examples editorials from the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. It is argued that a new, multidisciplinary theory of ideology should replace traditional approaches. Such a theory accounts for the interrelations between the social functions, the cognitive structures and the discursive expressions of ideologies. In this paper especially the cognitive dimension of ideologies and ideological opinions are highlighted, as well as the ways these mental structures relate to discourse structures. Finally, some practical recommendations are given for the ideological analysis of discourse.

Aims

Editorials and op-ed articles in the press are generally expected to express opinions. Depending on the type and the position of the newspaper, these opinions may vary considerably as to their ideological presuppositions. This rather common formulation seems to imply that ideologies of journalists somehow influence their opinions, which in turn influence the discourse structures of the opinion articles. Within the framework of a larger project on discourse and ideology, this paper examines some of the theoretical properties of these complex relations between ideology, opinions and media discourse. For instance, we need to spell out what exactly we mean by 'ideology' here, what the nature is of the commonsense notion of an 'opinion', and by what discourse structures they may be expressed.

At one level of analysis, opinions and ideologies involve beliefs or mental representations, and our approach therefore first takes a *cognitive* perspective. On the other hand, the ideologies and opinions of newspapers are usually not personal, but *social, institutional* or *political*. This requires an account in terms of social or societal structures. In fact, we integrate both approaches in one *socio-cognitive* theory that deals with shared social representations and their acquisition and uses in social contexts. And finally, since we examine in particular the sometimes subtle textual expressions of ideologically based opinions, this socio-cognitive orientation will be embedded in a discourse analytical framework (for details, see *van Dijk, 1995).

This approach is unique in rejecting the theoretical reduction that characterizes virtually all past and contemporary approaches to ideology. As is the case for language and knowledge, also ideologies are very complex social phenomena, which require independent conceptual analysis and empirical description at various theoretical levels. Thus, recognizing that ideologies are socially shared and used by groups and their members does not mean that therefore they cannot and should not *also* be described in cognitive terms. Again, in that respect ideologies are like knowledge and natural language (or rather like the grammars and discursive rule systems that underlie language use). Hence, our distinction between the mental and the social is a theoretical and analytical one, made to account for (the relations between) different dimensions of ideology.

Thus, in line with contemporary cognitive science, beliefs and hence also ideological belief systems need to be accounted for *also --though not exclusively--* in terms of mental representations and eventually (though not in this paper) in terms of the neurobiological structures of the brain. This does by no means imply a reduction to individualist, dualist, or mentalist positions. On the contrary, what we are after is precisely to show how elements of societal structure (such as groups, institutions, power or inequality), as well as the everyday social practices of discourse and other forms of interaction among people as group members, are systematically related to the socially constructed dimensions of their mind.

For us, then, the mind is both a commonsense as well as a theoretical concept. It is no less (and no more) 'real' or 'material' than equally unobservable societal structures and social practices. The latter are no more 'all in the mind' than that ideologies and other beliefs are all in interaction or discourse. Vague social-constructivist slogans as well as psychological reductions should finally give way to detailed theoretical analysis across disciplinary boundaries. In our view, only integrated socio-cognitive theories are able to explain in detail how social ideologies 'monitor' the everyday practices of social actors like journalists, and vice versa, how ideologies are formed and changed through the everyday interaction and discourse of members in societal contexts of group relations and institutions like the press.

Our examples will be taken from opinion articles in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, which may be taken to express a variety of more or less liberal and more or less conservative opinions and ideologies, depending also on the issues at hand, while at the same

time probably exhibiting fragments of an overall 'American' ideological perspective on news events and the world.

Ideologies

The concept of 'ideology' is one of the most elusive notions in the social sciences, but this paper shall not try to even summarize the long theoretical debate about this notion (see, among many other books, *CCCS, 1978; *Eagleton, 1991; *Larrain, 1979; *Thompson, 1984, 1990).

Rather, it is the aim of this paper to make a further step in the (slow) development of a new theory of ideology aiming to replace the hitherto rather vague notions of ideology in philosophy and the social sciences. This new theory has three main components:

A. Social functions. A theory of the functions of ideologies for groups or institutions within societal structure. This theory answers the simple question *why* people develop and use ideologies in the first place.

B. Cognitive structures. Within this framework, a theory is developed about the mental nature and the internal components and structures of ideologies, as well as their relations to other cognitive structures or social representations, such as socially shared values, norms, attitudes, opinions, and knowledge, on the one hand, and personal and contextual models (experiences, intentions, plans, etc.), on the other hand. This theory answers the question what ideologies look like, and how they monitor social practices.

C. Discursive expression and reproduction. A theory of the ways ideologies are expressed in, and acquired and reproduced by, the structures of socially situated text and talk. This theory is a special case of a broader theory of the ways ideologies are expressed and reproduced by social practices in general.

Social Functions

Since the social functions of ideologies have been amply discussed in the classical literature, we shall be very brief about them. Contrary to the conventional view, however, we do not limit ideologies to their role in the reproduction and legitimation of class domination. For one, also dominated groups need ideologies, e.g., as a basis for resistance. This means, secondly, that ideologies in general are not wrong or right, but rather more or less effective in promoting the interests of a group. Thirdly, we shall assume therefore that the main social function of ideologies is the *coordination* of the social practices of group members in view of the effective realization of the goals and the protection of the interests of a social group. This applies both to group-internal social practices as well as to interaction with members of other groups. Given this general function of ideologies, it is of course true that many ideologies are being developed precisely in order to sustain, legitimate or manage group conflicts as well as relationships of power and dominance.

Cognitive structures

In order for ideologies to effectively sustain such social functions, their cognitive contents, structures and strategies should somehow be tailored to these social functions. In other words, what people *do* as group members should reflect what they *think* as group members, and vice versa, a relation studied in terms of 'social cognition' (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Thus, social practices presuppose vast amounts of socio-cultural and group-specific beliefs or social representations, such as knowledge, attitudes, norms, values and ideologies. Our theory proposes that ideologies are the 'axiomatic' basis of the mental representations shared by the members of a social group. That is, they represent the basic principles that govern social judgment, viz., what group members think is right or wrong, true or false.

What do such ideologies look like? Despite the vast literature on ideologies, we don't know. But we may speculate about the typical contents and especially the structure of ideologies. For instance, many group ideologies involve the representation of Self and Others, Us and Them. Many of them, therefore seem to be *polarized*: We are Good and They are Bad, especially when conflicting interests are involved.

Such basic propositions of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation may influence the myriad of opinions and attitudes We have about Them in more specific social domains. Racist ideologies featuring such axiomatic propositions may thus coordinate prejudiced social group attitudes about minorities or immigrants, for instance in matters of immigration, residence, employment or education. In other words, the main cognitive function of ideologies is to organize specific group attitudes. This does not imply that ideologies as well as ideologically based attitudes are consistent, although in another sense they may well be coherent, viz., in relation to the basic interests of the group.

More generally, we propose that ideologies reflect the basic criteria that constitute the social identity and define the interests of a group. That is, ideologies may be represented as group self-schemata, featuring such categories as *Membership* (Who belongs to us? Who may be admitted?), *Activities* ('What do we do?'), *Goals* ('Why do we do this?'), *Values* ('How should we do this?'), *Position* ('Where are we? What are our relations to other groups?'), and *Resources* ('What do we have, and what not?'). Because these schemata are ideological, the way groups and their members represent themselves and others may of course be 'biased', as seen from the point of view of others (including that of us as analysts).

For the journalists as a group these ideological categories will feature basic information about who is recognized as a journalist (e.g., a diploma or license), what journalists typically do (e.g. write news and editorials), their goals (e.g., inform the public, serve as a 'watch-dog of society'), their values and norms (e.g., truth, reliability, fairness), position with respect to their readers or the authorities, and their typical group resource (information).

Ideologies and other social representations of the mind are 'social' because they are socially shared. As is the case for grammar and other forms of knowledge, such shared representations should be seen as general and abstract. As a practical criterion, we may say that all representations that are routinely presupposed in discourse and other social practices, are socially shared. Of course, throughout socialization, individual members may acquire slightly variable 'versions' of these social representations. Some members (e.g., the 'ideologues') of a group may have a more detailed and complete ideological system than others (see the discussion in Lau & Sears, 1986). This is the first source of individual variation in the enactment of ideologically based social practices, but it does not mean (as is sometimes argued) that therefore ideologies do not 'exist', no more than that grammars, discourse rules or socio-cultural knowledge do not exist because some members have more knowledge than others. That is, as suggested before, the analysis of ideologies should take place at the abstract the level of groups, and not at the level of individual cognition. Moreover, since individuals may belong to various social groups, they may have several ideologies, each variably influencing their social practices, depending on the situation. This also explains why personal uses of ideologies in concrete situations may be variable and often appear contradictory.

Models

General group ideologies and the specific group attitudes they organize may be expressed directly in discourse, e.g., by general expressions of opinions such as 'Women are less competent' in male chauvinist ideology. However, much opinion discourse, also in the press, is more specific, and not only expresses group opinions, but also personal knowledge and opinions about specific people, events and situations ('I disapprove of this invasion'). Such personal and specific opinions derive both from socially shared opinions or attitudes as well as from people's personal experiences and evaluations as these are represented in so-called mental *models*.

Models are the crucial interface between the social and the personal, between the general and the specific, and between social representations and their enactment in discourse and other social practices. Essentially models represent people's everyday experiences, such as the observation of or participation in actions, events or discourse. Unlike social representations they are personal, subjective and context-bound: They feature what individuals know and think about specific events, and account for the fact that such events and actions are subjectively interpreted. Thus, models explain why interpretations of discourse are constructive.

People ongoingly 'model' the events of their everyday lives, including the communicative events they engage in, or the news events they read about in the press. Thus, remembering, storytelling and editorializing involve the activation of old models, whereas intentions, plans, threats and announcements involve models about future events and actions. In sum, all our social practices are monitored (intended, understood) in terms of mental models.

Note that although such models as a whole are unique, personal and context-bound, large parts of them are of course social in the sense that the knowledge and opinions they embody are merely personal 'instantiations' of sociocultural knowledge and group opinions. In other words, models are indeed the interface between social representations, including ideologies, on the one hand, and social practices and discourse on the other hand.

From models to discourse

We now have the vital missing link between ideology and discourse: Ideologies organize specific group attitudes; these attitudes may be used in the formation of personal opinions as represented in models; and these personal opinions may finally be expressed in text and talk. This is the usual, indirect way of ideological expression in discourse. We have seen above, however, that in some forms of discourse ideologies may also be expressed directly, that is, in general statements.

Because models represent what people know and think about an event or situation, they essentially control the 'content', or semantics of discourse. Since however people know and think much more than they usually need to say for pragmatic reasons, only a fraction of the information in a model will usually be expressed in text and talk. This is of course also true for opinions: People do not always find it necessary or appropriate to say or write what they think. In many respects, thus, a text is merely the top of the iceberg of what is mentally represented in models. And conversely, due to the construction of a model and the application of knowledge and attitudes in this construction, people usually understand much more of a text than that it actually expresses.

We have already suggested that people not only form models about events they know about (through personal experience or through communication), but also specific models of the communicative events in which they participate. Such so-called context models will typically feature the overall definition of the situation (e.g., a lecture, talk with a friend or reading the newspaper), as well as subjective beliefs about participants in different roles, about overall aims and goals, setting, and so on. Context models are crucial in the production and comprehension of discourse. Whereas events models represent *what* is being communicated, context models largely regulate *how* this is being done, that is, the phonological, syntactic, lexical and other formal variation of text and talk. Like event models, such context models may of course also feature opinions, such as evaluative beliefs about other communicative participants, their roles, credibility, and so on. Reading editorials, thus, usually not only involves the formation of opinions about what is said, but also about the writer, or the newspaper.

It should be stressed again that the socio-cognitive framework presented here does not imply any primacy for the cognitive or the social dimensions of discourse or ideology. Rather, it aims to show the close relations between mind and society. However, it does imply that both theoretically and empirically there is no way societal structures can directly be related to

discourse structures. This is only possible through social actors and their mind, viz., through the mental interpretations or constructions of social and situational structures by group members. All accounts that ignore cognitive analysis of the processes involved in the development and uses of ideology are in our view simplifications or reductions. Indeed, if social structures (such as those of domination) could directly influence (cause?) social practices and discourse, no ideologies or other shared social representations of the mind (such as knowledge) would be needed in the first place. And if individual experiences and interpretations (as represented in models) would be ignored, this would imply that all social actors of a group would do and say the same thing.

Similarly, in relation to traditional approaches to ideology, we maintain that these have not begun to scratch the surface of accounting for the elementary question of what ideologies are exactly, how they are organized and how they 'control' (some aspects of) social practices and discourse. That ideologies are related to group conflict, power, domination and group identity, among others, and that they are developed in order to be able to enact, sustain and reproduce such relations (e.g., through 'false consciousness' or consensus) may be readily accepted. But such a characterization of overall functions does not yet provide a detailed theory of ideological structures and their relations to the discourse and other practices of social actors. Indeed, instead of such vague notions of 'false consciousness', contemporary psychology as well as the social sciences offer a vastly more sophisticated way to talk about the mind and its relation to society.

Opinions

Before we examine in some detail the discourse expressions of opinions in editorials, we briefly need to attend to the rather elusive notion of 'opinion' itself. Above, we defined opinions as 'evaluative beliefs', that is, as beliefs that feature an evaluative concept. In many cases, this poses no problem. Any belief that presupposes a value, and that involves a judgment about somebody or something, is evaluative, such as 'X is good (bad, beautiful, ugly, honest, intelligent)', depending on the values of a group or culture. Some judgments are evaluative only indirectly or in specific situations, e.g., when someone or something is being believed to be small or big, light or heavy and when such a factual belief itself presupposes a value judgment (e.g., 'being a small X is bad').

The same is true for categorizations, e.g., when someone is believed to be a thief or a terrorist. These may be factual beliefs if socially accepted, general criteria can be specified for such a categorization, e.g., the judgment of a court of law. On the other hand, if the factual criteria are less relevant, and the concept is used only or primarily to make a value judgment (someone is bad), then we deal with an opinion. Obviously, as is the case for all values and judgments, these may culturally or socially vary. And as soon as groups and conflicting groups interests are involved, such opinions will be said to be ideological.

This highly simplified account has merely practical implications for discourse analysis. It hides fundamental problems of cognition and philosophy, such as the basis of knowledge and belief, evaluations and judgments (*Lehrer, 1990; *Kornblith, 1994). In the social psychology of opinions and attitudes, such issues are usually ignored (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

In a discussion of ideology especially the criteria of truth and falsity become relevant here. Thus, if we define opinions as evaluative beliefs, and contrast these with factual beliefs, as we have done, we are begging the question if we are unable to distinguish between evaluative and factual beliefs. Both involve a judgment, but simply saying that this judgment presupposes values in opinions, and truth criteria in factual beliefs, again needs further explication.

Indeed, to take a relevant contemporary example, is the belief 'smoking is bad for our health' an opinion or a factual belief? It features a typically evaluative concept ('bad') and as such seems to be an opinion, viz., about smoking or smokers. On the other hand, when based on conclusions of scientific research, then the belief may be seen as factual.

In other words, it depends on the grounds or criteria of judgment. If these grounds are merely a cultural or group norm or value ('it is bad to damage our health by smoking') then the belief is an opinion. However, if the grounds are socially shared criteria of truth (e.g., observation, reliable communication, valid inference, scholarly research, etc.), or other knowledge based on such criteria, then the belief is factual (true or false). Both types of judgment are socially, historically and culturally relative. Also truth criteria may be different in different periods or for different groups. But for beliefs to be factual (true or false) it is only necessary that within each culture or group accepted criteria of knowledge are applied. And whenever these are especially in favor of a special group, the very system of knowledge and truth criteria may be ideologically based.

Note that we do not use the concept of 'opinion' here to refer to false beliefs, as is sometimes done in everyday language use. False beliefs are also factual if they can in principle be evaluated relative to a system of truth criteria. Conversely, opinions and ideologies are often said to represent the 'truth' for specific people or groups, but that does not make them factual in our sense: As soon as norms and values are involved they are evaluative and not factual.

Many other relevant notions that are commonly used in the distinction between knowledge and opinions, such as subjectivity and objectivity, or consensus, are ignored here. Similarly, a more discursive definition of knowledge and beliefs will not be proposed here: Although opinions are usually the object of disagreement, and debated in specific argumentative structures, the same may be true for factual beliefs. That is, the claim defended in an argument may be either factual or evaluative. Nor do we accept the discursive reduction of opinions and knowledge: For us, as for most psychologists, these are mental representations, and not discursive structures. That is, people are said to 'have' and share opinions, whether they express them in discourse or not, and both within and across specific contexts. That beliefs are socially

acquired, constructed, changed and used (also) through discourse is obvious, but that does not make them discursive in the usual sense of 'being a property of discourse'.

Discourse structures

After this brief summary of our theory of ideology and opinion, we now need to examine in some more detail how these may be expressed in text and talk in general, and in opinion articles in the press in particular. A discourse analytical approach to this question will typically do so by examining the various levels and dimensions of discourse.

Lexical items

Traditionally best known in studies of ideology and language, is the analysis of *lexical items*, as is the case for words such as 'democratic', 'terrorist' or 'racist'. That is, words may be chosen that generally or contextually express values or norms, and that therefore are used to express a value judgment. But although there are many predicates that are normally used to express an opinion (e.g., 'beautiful', 'dirty', etc.), others may be used factually or evaluatively (e.g., 'polluted', 'democratic', 'intelligent'), depending on whether a knowledge or value system is presupposed in their use, as discussed above.

However, precisely in a discourse analytical approach, we want to go beyond this obvious analysis of lexical items. Opinions may also be expressed in many other, much more complex, ways in text and talk, for instance in headlines, story structures, arguments, graphical arrangements, syntactic structures, semantic structures of coherence, overall topics, and so on.

Let us examine some of these somewhat more carefully, and thereby focus on the various semantic structures of discourse, since they form the core 'content' of the expression of ideological opinions (*van Dijk, 1995; for the semantic notions used here, see *van Dijk, 1985). As a convention, we refer to meanings, concepts and propositions (and hence to opinions) by using single quotes, and to the actual words, sentences and other expressions of such meanings with double quotes, or with italicized words.

Propositions

Concepts and their expressions in lexical items usually do not come alone, but combine into *propositions* expressed by clauses and sentences. Thus the occurrence of words that seem to imply opinions (such as "terrorist") does not mean much if we don't know the meaning of the sentences in which they occur (and, of course of the whole text and context, to which we turn below). For instance, there is considerable difference between the proposition 'He is a terrorist' and its denial 'He is not a terrorist', even if they both contain the concept of 'terrorist', and although both may be taken as expressions of opinions.

Propositions are usually analyzed in terms of a main predicate (usually interpreted as a property, event or action) and a number of arguments with different semantic roles, such as Agent, Patient, and so on, as in the proposition 'killed (Agent:terrorists, Patient: hostages)'. This proposition may further be modified by modalities such as 'It was necessary (possible, unlikely, etc.) that'.

Each category of a proposition may be modified again by another predicate, e.g. 'desperate(terrorists)' and 'terrified(hostages)'. As discussed above, each of these concepts may feature implied opinions. Thus, choosing 'desperate' rather than 'cold-blooded' as a modifier for 'terrorist' implies another, less negative, opinion suggesting that the terrorist had no other options but to kill the hostages. This implication also may be inferred from the choice of modalities such as 'They were obliged to...'. We find such use of necessity-modalities quite often in strategies that limit the negative actions of the authorities or the We-group, as in 'The police had to act tough against the demonstrators' (for examples in news reports about police actions, see *van Dijk, 1988b).

Interestingly, however, it is not merely the concepts involved in the proposition, but also the propositional structure itself that may express opinions. If negative acts are attributed to people appearing in the Agent role, then they are held (more) responsible for these actions than if they appear in other roles. Moreover, the *syntactic structure* of the sentence expressing such propositions may vary such that the agency of a special person or group is de-emphasized, as is the case in passive constructions (e.g. "The demonstrators were killed by the police", or "Demonstrators (were) killed". In this way, OUR people tend to appear primarily as actors when the acts are good, and THEIR people when the acts are bad, and vice versa, THEIR people will appear less as actors of good actions than do OUR people (for detailed analysis of these strategies, see e.g., *Fowler, 1991; Trew, 1979; *van Dijk, 1991).

We here find a first general strategy for the expression of shared, group based attitudes and ideologies through mental models. This strategy of polarization, positive ingroup-description, and negative outgroup-description thus has the following abstract evaluative structure, which we may call the 'ideological square':

1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions
4. Mitigate their good properties/actions

These functional moves of the overall strategy of ideological self-interest, which appears in most social conflicts and actions (e.g. in racist, sexist, etc. discourse), may be expressed in the choice of lexical items that imply positive or negative evaluations, as well as in the structure of whole propositions and their categories (as in active/passives, etc.). Here 'our' may refer to the ingroup or its friends and allies, and 'their' to the outgroup at its friends or allies (for social

psychological studies of these principles, e.g., in attribution, see e.g., *Fiske & Taylor, 1991; for the dimension of impression management, see *Tedeschi, 1981).

Implications

Opinions need not always be explicitly expressed in a proposition, but may be implied. Theoretically, this means that given an (expressed) proposition P, one or more propositions Q1, Q2, ... may be inferred from P on the basis of an event-model or context model, which may themselves presuppose instantiated knowledge or attitudes. Thus, in an editorial about the expulsion of 400 members of Hamas (an Islamist Palestinian movement), the *New York Times* concludes as follows:

- (1) Whatever Israel's offenses, it mocks reality for Arabs to imply that the expulsion is equivalent to Saddam Hussein's crimes against Kuwait or Libya's complicity in state terrorism. By all means hold Israel to the letter of Geneva Conventions. But don't exaggerate the scale and nature of the infraction (NYT, Ed, Jan 29, 1993).

The first sentence implies the opinion proposition that the Arabs are exaggerating, whereas the last sentence implies that the 'infraction' of the Israelis is in fact minor, which is also an opinion. Also the choice of the very concept of 'infraction' is by itself a form of mitigation. Since the Israelis are on OUR side, and Saddam Hussein and Lybia typically enemies and hence THEM, we also see the basic ideological framework being expressed that explains such a mitigating operation, as well as the implied propositions (in our detailed analysis of a sample opinion article below, we shall see how Saddam Hussein may also be used by Us to characterize other enemies).

Presuppositions

Propositions may be implied because they are presented to be known (to be true) or presupposed, given a model of an event. They may be strategically used to obliquely introduce propositions in a text which may not be true at all. This is also the case for presuppositions that embody opinions. Thus, in the previous example it was presupposed that the 'Arabs' indeed *did* exaggerate the scale and nature of the 'infraction', which by itself is a partisan opinion about the reaction of the Arabs. Earlier in the same editorial, we read the following passage:

- (2) Israel's defenders justly argue that the world takes too little note of the terrorist crimes committed by Islamic extremists, and of their fanatic determination to block any compromise settlement between Israelis and Arabs. (NYT, Ed, Jan 29, 1993).

Since the NYT claims that Israel's argument is valid, it also espouses the presuppositions of that argument, viz., that "Islamic extremists" committed terrorist crimes and block any compromise settlement. The very phrasing of that presupposition, while not attributed (by quotes) to Israel, is of the NYT, and hence also the opinions implied by the use of the lexical

items "terrorist crimes", "extremists", and "fanatic determination". No such words are used to describe the expulsion of 400 Palestinians by Israel. On the contrary, the article explicitly claims that this 'infraction' should not be exaggerated. Earlier in the article it is therefore described as a "blunder", and not as a "terrorist crime" of the State of Israel, as the Palestinians probably would have done. We see again how opinions about friends and enemies are being described, implied and presupposed following the ideological square proposed above.

Descriptions

Moving now to the proper discursive level of *sequences* of propositions, we find that events may be described at various levels of generality or specificity, and with many or few propositions at each level (*van Dijk, 1977). If we apply the ideological square to this phenomenon, we may expect that Our good actions and Their bad ones will in general tend to be described at a lower, more specific level, with many (detailed) propositions. The opposite will be true for Our bad actions and Their good ones, which, if described at all, will both be described in rather general, abstract and hence 'distanced' terms, without giving much detail.

Thus, again in the example from the NYT quoted above, the expulsion of Hamas members is evaluatively summarized with the predicate 'blunder' and as 'violating the Geneva convention.' Later, these Palestinians are described as "huddling in tents in a freezing no man's land in Lebanon", which may be read as implying something negative for the Israelis. However, this is the only negative way Israeli policies are being described in this article, whereas those of the Palestinian "terrorists" and the "Arab" states are being described in much more detail, as we have seen before in the description of the "terrorist crimes" and the "fanatic determination", as well as in the following passages:

- (3) But it would compound the blunder and jeopardize Middle East peace talks for Arab states to press for United Nations sanctions before President Clinton's team has even settled in. (...) (Palestinians huddling in tents...). That perfectly suits the banished Islamic militants, since their plight has effectively stalled the peace talks they vigorously oppose. (NYT, Ed, Jan 29, 1993).

Thus, Palestinians are described as wanting to block talks "vigorously", and to be "fanatically determined" to do so, and this is also true for other parts of the text: Negative Arab reactions are spelled out in detail (and emphasized) and negative Israel actions given little attention, mitigated or structurally subordinated.

Methodologically, single examples like these don't prove much, and it would need to be demonstrated, also quantitatively, that the overall strategy indeed applies. The example given is merely illustrative for the *kind* of operation at work: What we want to know is *how* opinions and attitudes may be expressed in discourse. Other work may then examine how *often* this happens, and whether the empirical hypothesis (about the differential descriptions of ingroups and outgroups) may hold up in quantitative comparisons.

Local coherence

One of the crucial semantic conditions of textuality is coherence, viz., the property of subsequent sentences (or propositions) in text and talk that defines why they 'hang together' or form a 'unity', and do not constitute an arbitrary set of sentences. Both in formal discourse studies and in our socio-cognitive approach, coherence is defined relative to models. That is, roughly speaking, a sequence of sentences is coherent if a model can be constructed for it. This may involve causal or conditional relations between the facts as represented by a model. In other words, coherence is relative and referential, viz., defined relative to the relations between facts of a model referred to, or talked about.

If coherence is based on models, and models may feature opinions, which in turn may be ideological, it should be expected that also coherence may involve opinions and ideologies. If Dutch employers believe, as many of them do, that immigrant workers don't work hard enough, or have insufficient knowledge of the language or lacking education, these are all opinions, but since they are believed to be 'true', they may function as the causal part of explanations, and thus make the texts of employers coherent (from their ideological perspective at least). Others might prefer to attribute high minority unemployment to the discrimination of the employers, rather than to blame the victims, and the 'ideological coherence' of their explanatory discourse would therefore be rather different (for detailed analysis of such biased talk of corporate managers, see *van Dijk, 1993).

Besides this form of referential or extensional coherence, sequences of propositions may also be related by intensional or functional relations: One proposition may be a Generalization, Specification, Contrast or Example of another proposition. Since meanings rather than models seem to be involved here, it is hard to see how such relations can be ideologically controlled by opinions. Yet, the use of such functional relations may have strategic, argumentative or rhetorical functions. Thus, it is one thing for an editorial to describe a 'riot' in terms of black 'violence', but quite another to add the Generalization that this is 'always the case', as also happens in many negative conversational stories about minorities (*van Dijk, 1984, 1987a). Similarly, in the same story, a storyteller may precisely emphasize that *we* have to wait years for an apartment, but that *they* get a new apartment right away. Storytellers thus may make a general claim, e.g., about the lack of cultural adaptation of immigrants, and then add an example (which may turn into a complete story). In sum, also the intensional relations precisely may reflect conflicting relations between groups, cognitive operations of generalization and specification, of comparison and contrast, and so on, which obviously maybe imbued by ideological opinions, as is also the case in the following example about the same case as discussed before, viz., the political consequences of the expulsion of 400 members of Hamas from Israel:

- (4) The greater challenge now is to revive the stalled peace talks. To do so, the Administration will need Arab help. Now that Israel has compromised on an issue of principle, are Arab leaders willing to do the same? (Editorial, New York Times, February 3, 1993).

The opposition and comparison between Israelis and Arabs become particularly clear in the last sentence, which is based on a contrast between Israel's 'positive' action (having granted the return of 100 of 394 expelled Palestinians), and the skepticism about any positive action by Arab leaders. In both cases, opinions are involved, and opposing the two parties as in this example is one move in the broader strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (the following sentence, indeed, is "Predictably, the P.L.O. has rushed to say no.").

Global coherence and topics

Local coherence between propositions of text or talk is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for discursive coherence: Another unifying principle is at work, viz., that of overall, or global coherence, as it is defined by 'topics' of paragraphs, large stretches of text or whole discourses. Such topics may be formally described as semantic macrostructures that are derived from local microstructures by specific mapping rules. In actual discourse processing, these rules take the form of efficient (but fallible) macro-strategies for the construction or local execution of topics (*van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).

Since propositions may be belief-propositions, also macro-propositions may represent opinions, as is typically the case in editorials. Both locally and globally, an editorial will express local and global opinions, respectively, as would typically become clear in summaries. Indeed, the NYT editorial of which we just analyzed a fragment, is summarized as follows in the Lexus data-base from which it was downloaded:

- (5) An editorial congratulates President Clinton for his first Middle Eastern foreign policy success in extracting concession from Israel on the issue of its deportation of 400 Palestinians, concluding that Arab countries can best promote the new seriousness about international law by returning to the peace talks (NYT, Ed., Feb 3, 1993).

Thus, the speech act of congratulation first presupposes that Clinton did something well (an opinion), and the (summary of the) recommendation at the end also involves an opinion about what Arabs should do. Thus, more in general, we may expect editorials of course to express, presuppose or imply opinions also at the overall, macro-level.

That such opinions reflect partisan positions and ideologies may be concluded from the same example. That Clinton is being congratulated with the 'extracting' of a concession from Israel, instead of being blamed for being unable to force the Israelis to comply with the resolution of the UN Security Council (ordering the return of *all* those who were illegally expelled), of course suggests on which side of the Middle East conflict the NYT editors stand --despite their critique of Israel, which is also clear in this editorial. Indeed, a locally critical opinion about Israel, is not the same as an overall, macro opinion about Israel that is negative. On the contrary, negative opinions about Israel typically occur in lower level, subordinate sentences.

Semantic moves

Overall ideological strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation may also be implemented at the local level of sentences and sentence sequences. In this way, one clause may express a proposition that realizes one strategy, and the next clause a proposition that realizes the other strategy. This is typically the case in the local semantic moves called disclaimers: "I have nothing against blacks, but...". In this so-called Apparent Denial, the first clause emphasizes the tolerance of the speaker, whereas the rest of the sentence (and often also the rest of the text) following the *but* may be very negative. In the same way may we encounter Apparent Concessions in the same racist paradigm ("There are also intelligent black students, but..."), or Apparent Empathy ("Of course refugees have problems, but..."), and so on.

The very strategies on which such local moves are based, precisely are intended to manage opinions and impressions, viz., what our conversational partners will think of us. Thus to avoid the negative impression of being an intolerant, ignorant bigot, the disclaimers are used as strategic prefaces of the negative part of the text. This does not mean that such moves are merely rhetorical. Obviously, speakers may well be convinced, on the basis of other (humanitarian) ideologies, that one *should* not have anything against blacks (*Billig, 1988).

At the end of example (1) we find two Apparent Concessions, in which Israel's 'infraction' and obligations are conceded (in initial but subordinate clauses), but the main focus is placed on the ridiculous claims of the Arabs (about comparing them with Saddam Hussein). Of course, such moves may also apply to other parties, e.g., when the NYT criticizes Premier Rabin as follows:

- (6) Whatever the domestic political costs for Mr. Rabin, magnanimity would better serve Israel's wider interests. (NYT, Ed, Jan 29, 1993).

Thus, the concession part pays tribute to the reality of the internal opposition against lifting the ban of the expelled, but the main thrust of the argument focuses on what the NYT thinks is best for Israel. Incidentally, also note the style of the recommendation, viz., the choice of the very positive 'magnanimity', which hardly seems compatible with making the expulsion of 400 citizens undone and complying with UN resolutions. Would the NYT describe a terrorist who releases some of his hostages 'magnanimous'? That is, also a critical position, viz., towards friends, may use kid gloves, and in fact express ideologically based opinions. This is a typical example of the move of emphasizing Our good actions.

Integration?

Having reviewed the mapping of opinions on several semantic structures, we may ask ourselves whether some general principles may be derived from our analyses? Is there some 'logic' in the way ideological (or other) evaluations tend to manifest themselves in discourse meaning?

To answer this question, let us briefly retrace our theoretical itinerary that brought us from ideologies to discourses: Discourse meanings derive from mental models of events, controlled by context models. These models may embody both personal and instantiated social opinions about events or about any of their relevant aspects (participants, their properties and actions, etc.). The social opinions 'applied' to a specific event and context may be organized in attitudes, which in turn may be based on ideologies shared by groups. These ideologies are mental representations whose categories schematically code for the major social dimensions of groups (identity, activities, goals, position, value, resources), and involve interest-based selections of values that underly the evaluations and the social practices of group members.

Thus, despite personal and contextual variation, opinions about events may be expected to express underlying ideological frameworks that also monitor social practices, and hence discourse, in strategic, self-interested ways. Especially in institutional and public discourse, it will generally be in the interest of a group if information is selected from a model and emphasized in discourse that is positive about the group of the speaker, and negative about opponents or Others. The converse is equally true: It will not be in our best interest to select and emphasize information that is negative for/about us, or positive for/about the Others. This is precisely what the ideological square, discussed above, suggests as an overall strategy in mapping models on text and talk.

How does such an overall strategy influence discourse semantics --what semantic strategies does it entail at all levels of discourse meaning? We may try to answer that question by distinguishing various dimensions of the moves that translate overall ideological strategies into semantic structures:

Volume. Models are generally much more detailed than the texts that express them. We usually know more than we say, and the same is true for our opinions, which we may often 'keep to ourselves', for good contextual reasons. This means that we are able to say more or less about an event. We may describe it in a few, general propositions, or use many propositions that characterize the event (and our opinions about it) in detail. Obviously, such variation may be constrained by the ideological square in an obvious way: Say a lot about our good things and their bad things, and say little about our bad things and their good things.

Importance. Models, like most mental schemata, are hierarchically organized: events have overall propositions (macrostructures) at the top, and more specific propositions at the bottom; for the same reason, some information is important, other information is less important, conceptually speaking, in the overall representation of an event. Since people may understand and hence model each event differently, also the hierarchical structures of events may be different. Similarly, for strategic ideological reasons, such differences of importance may be manipulated in discourse meaning: Some propositions will only appear at the lower level microstructure, others typically may function as overarching macropropositions. Thus, a 'race riot' may be mainly conceptualized as an act of 'black mob violence', as conservative white politicians and media will do, or as a form of 'urban resistance', as black or white radicals

might do. Macrostructural organization of models (how the event is globally interpreted) will thus influence the topicalization of discourse, and hence its global coherence and what is presented as important or less important information. The same may be true at the micro-level, where importance may translate in propositional (and then clausal) structure, as is the case with topic-comment or focus organization. As a strategy, thus, we will expect that information that is favorable about/for Us and unfavorable for Them will be construed as important or topical macro-information, and vice versa.

Relevance. The pragmatic dimension of relevance is about the utilitarian importance of information for (language) users or participants, and is therefore controlled by context models. Important information may still be less relevant for the readers or the audience, and conversely, unimportant details may well be relevant for them, if we measure relevance in terms of the seriousness or the scope of consequences for its users. Trivially, we may expect Our discourses to feature information and opinions that are particularly relevant for Us, and irrelevant for Them, and vice versa. For instance, though important, information about white racism may be found less relevant by white newspaper editors and hence be accorded less newsworthiness, as is indeed the case (van Dijk, 1991).

Implicitness/Explicitness. The presence or absence of model information may semantically be construed as explicitness or implicitness, and the influence of the ideological strategic square is obvious here: Make explicit the information and opinions that are good for us, and bad for them, and vice versa. Again, this may be at the overall level of the discourse (as we have seen for Volume), or at the level of words and sentences.

Attribution. In explanatory contexts, acts may be variously attributed to actors, and explained in terms of their properties or the situation (*Antaki, 1988; *Jaspars, Fincham, & Hewstone, 1983). Agency, responsibility and blame may also be attributed as a function of ideological orientation: Good acts will usually be self-attributed to ourselves (or our allies) and bad acts other-attributed to the Others (or their allies), and in both cases these groups are assigned full control and responsibility for their acts. The converse is true for our bad acts and their good acts: Our bad acts will be deemphasized and attributed to circumstances beyond our control, and the same is true for their good acts ('they were just lucky'). These various attribution strategies may appear at all levels of action description, and also appear in word order (responsible agency may be preferentially expressed by grammatical subjects and in initial position).

Perspective. Inherent in the notions of ideology, attitudes and the specific opinions based on them is the notion of 'position': Events are described and evaluated from the position, point of view or perspective of the speaker. This perspective may be cultural, social, personal or situational, and may apply to all levels and dimensions of discourse. That is, judgments are by definition relative, as also a synonym of opinion, viz., the concept of 'standpoint', suggests. This is true for the subjective point of view of the individual, as much as for the shared, inter-subjective opinions of group members. Situational perspective is expressed, first of all, in

context-dependent deictics (pronouns, demonstratives and adverbs like 'here', 'now' and 'today'), verbs (like 'come' and 'go') and position- or relation-dependent nouns (such as 'home', 'sister' and 'neighbor'), among other expressions. Personal perspective trivially manifests itself in fixed expressions such as 'from my point of view', 'in my opinion', or 'as far as I am concerned'. The plural forms of such expressions may indicate social perspective ('from our point of view', etc.), which however may also simply be expressed by first person plural pronouns, as in the well-known ethnocentric example "We are not used to that here", used to express negative opinions about the acts of foreigners. A well-known slogan expressing a socio-political (and geographical) perspective, viz., an anti-American one, is of course "Yankee, go home!". Implicitly this is also the case in the racist slogan of the National Front in France: "Les Français d'abord", which of course implies that the person who is speaking is French.

In sum, given a mental model of an event, and a context model of the current communicative event, the overall strategic principles examined above allow language users to express their opinions not only through explicitly evaluative words, but also as follows:

- *the generality vs. specificity, and the quantity of model propositions used in descriptions of events.
- *the explicitness vs. the implicitness of model propositions.
- *the relative importance assigned to propositions relative to others.
- *the contextual relevance assigned to propositions.
- *the attribution of agency, responsibility and blame for actions.
- *the perspective from which events are described and evaluated.

These different discursive strategies have several functions, such as enhancing the vividness of descriptions or the credibility of accounts, and for our analysis they are particularly relevant in expressing the ideological perspective and the opinions of groups and their members. In each case, then, the strategy applies 'via' the ideological square: the type of description (general, or explicit, etc.) must be in our favor, in our interest, or in any other way contribute positively and persuasively to our self-presentation and impression-management, or conversely, contribute to the negative presentation of our opponents, enemies or the Others in general.

Surface structures

In the previous sections we focused on the mapping of opinions and ideologies on semantic structures of discourse. Meanings are however expressed in various 'forms' or 'surface structures', that is, in concrete lexical items, clause and sentence structure, syntactic categories, word order, discourse intonation, graphical structures, and the organization of macrostructures in canonical schemata, such as those of narration, argumentation or news reporting.

Many of the semantic structures examined above, as well as the opinions embodied in them, thus need to be inferred from such surface structures. However, these structures or forms also

may play their own role in the expression of opinions. One of the ways they do so is by the formal implementation of the ideological square: Meanings, and therefore opinions, may be emphasized or de-emphasized also by their expressions: They may be expressed on top (as in headlines), earlier in the text (as in leads of news reports), in topical (initial) positions in sentences, or through a complex system of rhetorical 'figures of speech' (repetition, parallelism, metaphor, comparison, irony, litotes, etc.), or vice versa for meanings/opinions that need to be de-emphasized. We shall not further investigate the details of these expression structures of opinions in this paper, but it should be borne in mind that many of the discursive strategies of ideological expression are formal. Conversely, in text comprehension, these expression structures in turn influence semantic interpretation, and hence also the construction of opinions in models.

An example

To illustrate the theoretical analysis proposed above, let us finally examine in some detail how ideologies and opinions may be expressed and combined at the different levels of a typical 'opinion article', viz., in an op-ed piece in the *Washington Post*, written by Jim Hoagland:

(7) GADHAFI: SINISTER POSTURING

[1] A moment comes when a tyrant crosses a line of no return. In the grip of megalomania, he is incapable of making rational calculations of cost and gain. He strikes out in fury and in fear, intent on destroying even if it means destruction will visit him in turn.

[2] Iraq's Saddam Hussein crossed that line in the spring of 1990. But the outside world paid little heed until he invaded Kuwait that summer. Libya's Moammar Gadhafi now has crossed that line. The international community should not repeat the mistake it made with Saddam.

[3] On Sunday Gadhafi invited the world's two most notorious Palestinian terrorists, Ahmed Jibril and Abu Nidal, to visit Tripoli, perhaps to set up headquarters there. The Libyan leader told a cheering crowd in the town of Azizia that the invitations were meant to defy the United Nations.

[4] Gadhafi has shown that he no longer values the cloak of silence or acquiescence in his evil that he sought to purchase or extort. He is on the attack, pushing his long confrontation with the West back to the breaking point.

[5] For months Egyptian diplomats, fearful of the damage Gadhafi could do their country, and European oil executives and Washington lawyers, enamored of the lucre Gadhafi could send their way, have spoken of Gadhafi's new 'moderation' and have urged the international community to treat him with reasonableness and patience.

[6] He was, the lawyers submitted, about to change his spots on terrorism. He was, the Egyptians said, misunderstood and in any event a lesser evil than the Islamic fundamentalists who have declared war on the Egyptian regime. He was, the oil men claimed, a leader they could do business with, on favorable terms.

[7] Their pleas for patience lie in ruins now that Gadhafi has renewed his public embrace of terrorism, in word and deed. He has responded with vitriol and menace to the mild economic sanctions placed on his regime by the U.N. Security Council.

[8] The Security Council has demanded that Gadhafi turn over for trial abroad two of his security aides, who are accused by the United States of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on Dec. 21, 1988. His refusal to do so triggered sanctions that restrict air travel to and from Libya and freeze Libya's oil revenues banked abroad.

[9] Intelligence reports link Jibril and his General Command organization to the planning of the Pan Am massacre, which cost 270 lives. Although Jabril's exact role is not clear, Gadhafi's invitation strips away the pretense that the Libyan is interested in seeing justice done in this case.

[10] As sinister as his invitation to the two managing partners of Terror Inc. is Gadhafi's suspected involvement in the kidnapping over the weekend in Cairo of Mansour Kikhiya, his former foreign minister, who broke with Gadhafi over terrorism to become a leading dissident - - and a resident of the United States, due to become a U.S. citizen next year.

[11] Kikhiya's associates tell me he had gone to Cairo reluctantly and only after receiving personal guarantees from senior Egyptian officials of safe passage. He was well aware of the presence of Libyan secret police and of the Egyptian government's effort to shield Gadhafi from international punishment by arguing against sanctions.

[12] But on Dec. 10 Kikhiya disappeared from his hotel room in Cairo. Left behind in the room were the insulin and syringe Kikhiya needs every eight hours to treat his diabetes.

[13] Politically sensitive visitors like Kikhiya are routinely kept under surveillance by Egypt's internal intelligence service. His disappearance raises the question of Egyptian complicity in or tolerance of a Libyan plot to eliminate the Libyan exile movement. The movement has begun to worry Gadhafi, who brands the exiles as 'stray dogs and dollar slaves.'

[14] Gadhafi stands at a crossroads similar to the one that Saddam confronted in the spring and summer of 1990. He responds with a similar lashing out at those who would thwart him, even at the cost of embarrassing an Egyptian government that has defended him.

[15] Libya is not broke or gravely weakened by a long war, as Iraq was. But Gadhafi is boxed in and embarrassed by sanctions. Sanctions show the Libyan population that Gadhafi is not the omnipotent, respected leader he claims to be.

[16] Rather than sink into impotence, Saddam went to war. Gadhafi does not have the ground army to do that. But he does have an army of international terrorists, including those who carried out his orders to bomb Pan Am 103 five years ago this month.

[17] Abu Nidal has also favored the Christian and Jewish year-end holiday seasons as moments for terrorist outrages. His men shot up the airports in Rome and Vienna in December 1985.

[18] It is impossible to know if Gadhafi was simply reminding the world of his sinister capabilities, or foreshadowing new atrocities with his public welcome of terrorists. But he has warned the world that he must be watched and confronted anew after a season of phony peace.

Let us analyze the evaluative and ideological strategies of this article paragraph by paragraph, beginning with the headline.

GADHAFI: SINISTER POSTURING

In this headline, as well as in the rest of the text, the main target for Hoagland's attack is of course Gadhafi, generally known as the devil incarnate of conservative U.S. foreign policy (for details, see *Chomsky, 1987). Structurally, the importance of Gadhafi is first emphasized by his appearance in the title, which means that he is the actor of a macroproposition. Secondly, fronting his name in the title further emphasizes his agency and responsibility of the nominalized verb "posturing", an effect that would be less obvious in the normal ordering for this sentence: 'The sinister posturing of Gadhafi. Then, Hoagland's negative opinions are explicitly expressed in the choice of 'sinister' and 'posturing', the first predicate being associated with secret and dark forces, and the second with affectation and a pose, and as having a big mouth, but really being nobody. Both predicates obviously are intended in the political sense, and hence express not so much Hoagland's personal opinion, but a shared U.S. evaluation of Gadhafi. Note also that *what* Gadhafi has done is not topicalized in the headline, but only the *way* he does it, so that it is the evaluation itself that is thus emphasized. In the system of the ideological square, this is a clear example of negative other-presentation, as well as an example of emphasizing these negative properties of the other.

[1] A moment comes when a tyrant crosses a line of no return. In the grip of megalomania, he is incapable of making rational calculations of cost and gain. He strikes out in fury and in fear, intent on destroying even if it means destruction will visit him in turn.

The relevant opinions expressed here appear first of all in the lexical style, viz., in words such as *tyrant*, *megalomania*, *strikes out*, *fury*, and *destroying*, all predicated of an imaginary dictator, but (after the title) clearly meant as a generic description that fits Ghadafi. The political evaluation becomes obvious in the choice of *tyrant*, which not only categorizes him as undemocratic or even as a dictator, but also as someone who viciously oppresses his people. Moreover, the choice of *tyrant* is part of a long tradition of orientalist descriptions of eastern 'despots', also applied to e.g., Saddam Hussein, but seldom to 'western' dictators, such as Batista of Cuba, Pinochet of Chile or Stroessner of Paraguay. That is, there are various types of demonization, and the most important, political criterion for the choice of opinion predicates is whether dictators are 'ours' or 'theirs', following the ideological principle that our bad things tend to be mitigated, and theirs emphasized (see also *Herman, 1992; *Herman & Chomsky, 1988).

Another evaluative sequence or 'opinion line', continuing the use of *posturing* in the title, is picked up again by the use of *megalomania*. Again, Ghadafi is negatively being described as someone who thinks he is bigger than he is, but the specific term also implies a form of mental deficiency: he is a lunatic. This personal evaluation of someone who 'has lost his mind' also appears in the statement that Gadhafi is unable to make rational calculations, that he strikes out in fury and fear and is self-destructive.

Thus, whereas Gadhafi is first politically placed beyond the pale of democracy and humanity, he now is also excluded from the world of 'us, sane' people. These various evaluations presuppose that Hoagland speaks from the point of view of Western, U.S., rational, democratic people(s), and the usual ideological polarization here therefore opposes this group with one of its main enemies, while he is the incarnation of anti-western, anti-U.S., anti-democratic, etc. forces.

Thirdly, Gadhafi is not only a tyrant (for his own people) and a lunatic, but also a threat, since he is said to be 'intent on destroying', which brings in the relevant international perspective already addressed above. Note that the opinion about his being a threat is not expressed itself, but based on an inference, viz., from the explicit opinion that he is destructive, and the implicit knowledge that he is a head-of-state: violent, crazy dictators are a threat to the world, as was already suggested by the use of the concept of 'destruction' earlier in this paragraph.

Perhaps most interesting in this paragraph is the seemingly innocent phrase "even when it means destruction will visit him in turn", since the international dimension of Ghadafi's aggressiveness here seems to suggest a legitimization of retaliation, following the maxim derived from militarist ideologies: We are allowed to destroy someone who is bent on destroying us. It was precisely this legitimization of course that Reagan used when the U.S. air force bombed Tripoli some years earlier, killing a large number of civilians, among whom a child of Ghadafi. In that case, incidentally, Ghadafi's alleged posturing, rather than his destruction, were seen as sufficient reasons to attack Tripoli.

[2] Iraq's Saddam Hussein crossed that line in the spring of 1990. But the outside world paid little heed until he invaded Kuwait that summer. Libya's Moammar Gadhafi now has crossed that line. The international community should not repeat the mistake it made with Saddam.

As may be expected, a 'tyrant' like Ghadafi invites comparison with the other demon of U.S. foreign policy: Saddam Hussein. The same metaphor used in the Gulf War (about the line drawn in the sand of the desert) is now applied to the case of Lybia, in order to accentuate the similarity of the threats posed by both dictators to the international community. Note that "the outside world paid little heed" seems a factual statement, but in fact implies an opinion, viz., that according to Hoagland the outside world *should* have paid more attention, which is a normative implication, as is also clear from the last sentence of this paragraph ("should not repeat the mistake"). Here we encounter the typical recommendation speech act that is a standard part of editorials and op-ed articles: After an analysis of what is wrong (an opinion), it is concluded what should be done, which semantically is also an opinion, and pragmatically an act of advice or recommendation.

[3] On Sunday Gadhafi invited the world's two most notorious Palestinian terrorists, Ahmed Jibril and Abu Nidal, to visit Tripoli, perhaps to set up headquarters there. The Libyan leader told a cheering crowd in the town of Azizia that the invitations were meant to defy the United Nations.

After the evaluative introduction of the editorial, we here find the newsworthy 'facts' that form the immediate cause or 'peg' of the opinion piece, viz., Gadhafi's invitation of two Palestinians. The evaluation implied by the use of *notorious* en *terrorist* is standard fare, and is part of the overall opinion-coherence of the article, representing fragments of the attitude of Hoagland and many of his colleagues about the Middle East conflict. The last sentence of this paragraph is more interesting. As such it is a factual statement, and not an opinion; indeed, it may be true or false, and the truth criteria are non-subjective (although there may be some dispute about when a group of people is a 'crowd' and when their actions are called 'cheering'). And Gadhafi might indeed have defied the United Nations, although there may be some doubt about whether Gadhafi actually said it that way. Given the authority of the UN, however, defying the UN would normally be a negative act (although the USA itself defied UN resolutions many times). This means that, by stating this, there may be at least an implicit opinion, based on the general evaluative belief that defying legitimate institutions is wrong. This description ties in with the earlier characterization of Gadhafi as a dangerous megalomaniac, and at the same time provides the 'proof' of such a characterization: He who defies the UN must be both aggressive and a fool.

[4] *Gadhafi has shown that he no longer values the cloak of silence or acquiescence in his evil that he sought to purchase or extort. He is on the attack, pushing his long confrontation with the West back to the breaking point.*

The opinions here are very explicit, as is most obvious in the standard way to describe the most terrible of opponents: they are *evil*, as also Reagan's description of the former USSR as the 'evil empire' made world-known. The use of *extort*, *attack* and *confrontation*, are similarly borrowed from a lexical repertoire designed to describe the acts of the enemy. Note though that the opinion does not merely imply a negative evaluation of aggression. There is a lot of aggression in the world that Jim Hoagland and the *Washington Post* do not routinely write about. The crucial point, as also expressed by the earlier verb *defy*, is that Gadhafi confronts *Us* in the West (and especially *Us*, Americans). That is, the ideological polarization between *Us* and *Them* (or in this case between *Us* and *Him*) is being activated here to influence the organization of opinions in this article. As the theory predicts, this will usually happen through specific negative attitudes about the Others, in this case about 'their' violence and aggression in general, and their terrorism, in particular. Hoagland follows this standard evaluative scenario rather faithfully.

[5] *For months Egyptian diplomats, fearful of the damage Gadhafi could do their country, and European oil executives and Washington lawyers, enamored of the lucre Gadhafi could send their way, have spoken of Gadhafi's new 'moderation' and have urged the international community to treat him with reasonableness and patience.*

Hoagland's opinion discourse now shifts to those who are prepared to accept Ghadafi, and the choice of *enamored of the lucre* implies that being overly fond of profits is viewed negatively

here --not of course because this is in line with the basic tenets of capitalism both Hoagland and the WP undoubtedly espouse, but rather that this means doing business with the enemy. The use of quotes in the description of Ghadafi as being 'moderate' implies that Hoagland does not agree at all with such a characterization, as indeed his earlier epithets in this piece show rather unambiguously. Here the old rule seems to apply that the friends of our enemy are also our enemy, so that oil executives and lawyers in this case are evaluated accordingly.

[6] He was, the lawyers submitted, about to change his spots on terrorism. He was, the Egyptians said, misunderstood and in any event a lesser evil than the Islamic fundamentalists who have declared war on the Egyptian regime. He was, the oil men claimed, a leader they could do business with, on favorable terms.

The arguments of those who have a less negative view of Gadhafi are replayed, but again the lexicalization of these arguments does not seem to imply agreement. The use of the verbs *submitted* and *claimed* suggests as much, and also the expression *about to change his spots on terrorism* reveals Hoagland's serious doubts about Gadhafi's change. The rhetorical parallelism of the sentence structures of this paragraph further stresses this doubt about the claims of those Hoagland criticizes. Interesting for our analysis is that opinions also appear when people evaluate other's opinions.

[7] Their pleas for patience lie in ruins now that Gadhafi has renewed his public embrace of terrorism, in word and deed. He has responded with vitriol and menace to the mild economic sanctions placed on his regime by the U.N. Security Council.

The support of Hoagland's skepticism follows in this paragraph: A new enumeration of Gadhafi's evils is used to belie those who wanted to placate him: *embrace of terrorism*, *vitriol*, and *menace*. These opinions fit in the overall negative characterization of Gadhafi as a dangerous terrorist. In light of such an opinion, being patient or mild is clearly found an inadequate response. For our analysis this is interesting, because it shows that words that usually imply positive opinions, are used here in a critical way.

[8] The Security Council has demanded that Gadhafi turn over for trial abroad two of his security aides, who are accused by the United States of carrying out the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on Dec. 21, 1988. His refusal to do so triggered sanctions that restrict air travel to and from Libya and freeze Libya's oil revenues banked abroad.

These factual statements simply appear to explain the historical background of the (mild) economic sanctions against Lybia, and do not explicitly express opinions. Yet, mentioning the fact that Gadhafi is accused of bombing an aircraft, is in line with, and supports the earlier qualification of Gadhafi as a terrorist, whereas referring to his refusal to comply with the demands of the Security Council is a specification of the earlier evaluative act description of defiance. In other words, factual statements about negative actions (bombing an aircraft) may not express an opinion, but strongly suggest such an opinion, which in this case might be that

of the reader. Moreover, factual statements may support opinion statements: Bombing an aircraft is a form of terrorism, and refusal to comply with demands of the international community (and especially of the USA), a form of megalomania.

[9] Intelligence reports link Jibril and his General Command organization to the planning of the Pan Am massacre, which cost 270 lives. Although Jabril's exact role is not clear, Gadhafi's invitation strips away the pretense that the Libyan is interested in seeing justice done in this case.

A similar negative description of the 'facts' is given here of another enemy, viz., Jabril, and the selection of *massacre* and *cost 270 lives*, is clearly monitored by a strongly negative opinion. Note also the disclaimer *Although Jabril's exact role is not clear*, which keeps some journalistic distance towards the evidence of the intelligence reports, but which also suggests that what follows is evaluated negatively.

[10] As sinister as his invitation to the two managing partners of Terror Inc. is Gadhafi's suspected involvement in the kidnapping over the weekend in Cairo of Mansour Kikhiya, his former foreign minister, who broke with Gadhafi over terrorism to become a leading dissident -- and a resident of the United States, due to become a U.S. citizen next year.

The key-word of the title, *sinister* appears again to qualify Gadhafi's actions as threatening and ominous, along with the rest of his portrayal as a terrorist. The picture is here completed by Gadhafi's (suspected) involvement in kidnapping a former associate. Inviting two terrorists, and important ones at that, is by itself a negative act, and calling it 'sinister' merely emphasizes the point. To mark the usual Us vs. Them articulation of ideological discourse, Kikhiya is now promoted to the status of dissident: The enemies of our enemies become our friends, and may be awarded citizenship. In other words, Gadhafi is not merely suspected of kidnapping a former associate (indeed, why would that be relevant to 'Us'?), but in fact of kidnapping a (near) U.S. citizen, and hence attacking the USA.

[11] Kikhiya's associates tell me he had gone to Cairo reluctantly and only after receiving personal guarantees from senior Egyptian officials of safe passage. He was well aware of the presence of Libyan secret police and of the Egyptian government's effort to shield Gadhafi from international punishment by arguing against sanctions.

[12] But on Dec. 10 Kikhiya disappeared from his hotel room in Cairo. Left behind in the room were the insulin and syringe Kikhiya needs every eight hours to treat his diabetes.

The only expression of opinion in these two paragraphs may be the reference to 'Lybia's secret police': Only dictatorships have a secret police, so Lybia is a dictatorship. Note also the reference to a source, a rather unusual move in an opinion article, but here strategically effective, while making the accusations more credible. Similarly indirect is the reference to Kikhiya, being a patient in need of regular medication, but having left his medicine in the hotel room, which suggests that he must have been kidnapped. This 'proof' of abduction at the same

time emphasizes the negative characteristics of the Others: they even abduct sick men and do not give him his medication.

[13] Politically sensitive visitors like Kikhiya are routinely kept under surveillance by Egypt's internal intelligence service. His disappearance raises the question of Egyptian complicity in or tolerance of a Libyan plot to eliminate the Libyan exile movement. The movement has begun to worry Gadhafi, who brands the exiles as 'stray dogs and dollar slaves.'

Note that the security force of 'our friend' Egypt is not called a 'secret police' but an 'internal intelligence service', thus lexically differentiating those associated with Us, and those associated with Them. The use of *brand* in the last sentence implies that Hoagland does not agree with the way Gadhafi describes his opponents, and the nature of the description itself is so preposterous, that only mentioning it is sufficient to qualify it. That exiles are called 'dollar slaves' by Gadhafi further exacerbates the polarization between Us and Them, since 'dollars' are associated with the West or the USA.

[14] Gadhafi stands at a crossroads similar to the one that Saddam confronted in the spring and summer of 1990. He responds with a similar lashing out at those who would thwart him, even at the cost of embarrassing an Egyptian government that has defended him.

[15] Libya is not broke or gravely weakened by a long war, as Iraq was. But Gadhafi is boxed in and embarrassed by sanctions. Sanctions show the Libyan population that Gadhafi is not the omnipotent, respected leader he claims to be.

Paragraph [14] paraphrases earlier parts of the text, using the same comparison with Saddam Hussein, and *lashing out* continues the phrase "He strikes out in fury and fear" used in the first paragraph; both have negative implications. The opinion at the end of paragraph [15] is complex and interesting. The use of the verb "to show that" implies that the speaker holds the proposition to be true, so that Gadhafi in fact is *not* omnipotent and respected by his people -- and hence a dictator. Similarly, since they hurt Gadhafi rather than his people, also the use of sanctions is legitimated, which is an indirect opinion.

[16] Rather than sink into impotence, Saddam went to war. Gadhafi does not have the ground army to do that. But he does have an army of international terrorists, including those who carried out his orders to bomb Pan Am 103 five years ago this month.

[17] Abu Nidal has also favored the Christian and Jewish year-end holiday seasons as moments for terrorist outrages. His men shot up the airports in Rome and Vienna in December 1985.

Although Saddam Hussein and Gadhafi are incomparable in military aspects, Gadhafi makes up for this by his "army of terrorists", and his control of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. What earlier in the text was a U.S. accusation of Gadhafi's involvement, is here presented as

fact. And as before, since Gadhafi associates himself with the terrorist Abu Nidal, he is himself a terrorist. Also these examples hardly express explicit opinions, but the description of the people who he associates with as 'terrorists' and their actions as 'terrorist outrages' clearly reveals a negative evaluation.

[18] It is impossible to know if Gadhafi was simply reminding the world of his sinister capabilities, or foreshadowing new atrocities with his public welcome of terrorists. But he has warned the world that he must be watched and confronted anew after a season of phony peace.

In this concluding paragraph, the evaluative description *sinister* is used again, whereas *atrocities* continues the line of negative descriptions of the acts of Gadhafi. The final recommendation (that he must be watched) is of course itself based on norms and values informing this piece, and hence a political opinion. Even the positive concept of 'peace' associated with Gadhafi may be converted into 'phony peace', thus making Gadhafi unreliable even when he keeps quiet: He can never be trusted.

Concluding remarks

Having briefly commented on the various types of opinion expression in a typical conservative op-ed article in the U.S. press, we may finally try to summarize our observations more analytically in light of the earlier theoretical framework:

Polarization. Opinions may be organized following an ideological pattern that polarizes ingroups and outgroups, Us vs. Them. This principle also has a number of corollaries in the form of maxims, such as 'The Enemy of our Enemy is Our Friend.' In this case, the basic dual ideologies used are the familiar ones of western superiority and Arab inferiority, in which case *We* are associated with positive values such as democracy, rationality, and non-violence, and *They* with dictatorship, violence and irrationality. More specifically, the ideology of Arab inferiority here focuses on attitudes on terrorism, organizing a set of socially shared opinions about various aspects of terrorism and their associated scripts (such as bombing, kidnapping, killing innocent people, etc.). Moreover, following the logic of Ingroup-Outgroup relations, the Others are also presented as a Threat.

Opinion Coherence. Specific opinions about specific terrorists (Ghadafi, Nidal, Jibril) may follow the application of this general attitude. Together with scripts about terrorist attacks and abductions of political opponents, this instantiation of an attitude also sustains what we have called the 'opinion-coherence' of discourse in that various aspects of terrorism are being discussed.

Attribution. Attributions of negative actions to our enemies require that our enemies are described as responsible agents, who are consciously, intentionally, and cynically aware of what they do and of the consequences of their actions, even if these actions may be branded as irrational or even crazy at the same time. On the other hand, those of us who are too friendly

for our enemies do not fully realize what they are doing, and hence they may be advised to mend their errors.

Description. Also the identifying descriptions of groups or institutions related to Us and Them follow the principle of ideological polarization. Thus, Their security forces are called the 'secret police', whereas ours are an 'intelligence agency'.

Interest. Positive or negative opinions about Our or Their actions basically follow an evaluative logic based on a construction of what Our best interests are. Thus, Ghadafi's 'posturing' is not primarily judged to be evil as such (indeed, many of our friends, e.g., Israel, do likewise), but to be evil while seen to threaten our (U.S., western) interests in the world.

Implicitness. Opinions may be explicit and implicit, direct and indirect. Some opinions in this op-ed article may be derived from a combination of factual statements with norms, values and positions of the author. Thus "crossing a line" is, as such, not an evaluative predicate, but in the present context it expresses the opinion that Ghadafi has gone too far. Similarly, the factual description of terrorist acts (such as bombing an aircraft), does not express an opinion either, but shared social attitudes about such acts allow readers to derive the appropriate opinions.

Meta-opinions. Opinions may be opinions about other opinions. Thus, (too) positive opinions about our enemies are disqualified (as too moderate, too mild). Similarly, opinions may apply to speech acts of others: Doubts about the contents of the assertions of others may thus be expressed by discrediting them as mere 'claims' or 'submissions'.

Expression. The expression of opinions may be enhanced in several stylistic and rhetorical ways. Words describing negative acts may be taken from the repertoire of mental health, and opponents described as irrational, lunatic, and megalomaniac. Another strategy is to compare a target enemy with another, certified enemy, e.g., Gadhafi with Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein with Hitler, and all of them with devils and demons. Negative characterizations are also enhanced by rhetorical contrasts: Opposing negative actions of Them, with positive one of Us (e.g., mild sanctions of the UN are met by sinister posturing and threats of terrorist warfare). Also alliterations (*fury and fear*), parallelisms and especially lexical repetition (*sinister*) may attract attention to specific opinions. Similarly, negative opinions about Them tend to be detailed, repeated, and illustrated with concrete examples. Thus the terrorism of Ghadafi, Jibril and Nidal, is detailed by reference to the bombing of the PanAm flight, the kidnapping of a Lybian dissident, and so on.

Unmentionables. Negative information and hence negative opinions about Us, i.e. self-critique, may be left completely unsaid in violent ideological confrontation. Not only is Ghadafi totally evil, but We (the USA, the West, etc.) are totally good. We have done nothing to provoke Ghadafi. Thus, the equally terrorist bombing of Tripoli by the U.S. air force, killing innocent children, is not even mentioned, although hinted at with a phrase like "destruction will visit him". Thus, our attacks on our enemies are always provoked and hence justified.

Arguments. Opinions usually need support. That is, they are preceded or followed by a sequence of assertions that make them more plausible by various rules of inference, based on attitudes and values. Similarly, possible negative opinions about us, are forestalled by implicit counter-arguments against such opinions. Opinions in op-ed articles usually are formulated as evaluative support for a speech act of advice, recommendation or warning, which define the pragmatic point or conclusion of an opinion article.

Using History. Ideological opinions selectively invoke and hide history. Thus, terrorism is presented as a timeless evil. No historical background or explanation for Their violence against Us is given, no reference to the Middle-East conflict made, not even a brief disclaimer about the plight of the Palestinians. On the other hand, it is necessary to show historical continuity, so that we learn from history. Hence the reference to the Gulf war and Saddam Hussein. Similarly, more culturally, we need continuity in presenting Arabs as the enemy of the West by describing them in terms of ideological opinions that are part of a long orientalist tradition of western superiority and Arab inferiority.

We have summarized the findings of our analysis in terms of a number of rather specific moves that are typical for the expression of underlying ideologies in opinion articles. These moves generally enact the major overall strategy of ideological discourse, viz., those of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. At the same time, the discourse structures involved enable us to witness 'at the surface' some of the underlying trajectory that relates ideologies to discourse, such as the values involved in ideological statements, their polarization, their implementation in domain-related attitudes (in this case about international politics), their influence on specific models about specific events and participants (what Gadhafi did), and the ways these are presented as a function of a context model (of Hoagland writing in the Washington post, especially for U.S. citizens, and mores specifically addressing U.S. politicians and other elites, such as business people).

Suggestions for ideological analysis

There is not one, standard way to do critical discourse analysis, nor to do ideological analyses of editorials or other types of text or talk. From the discussion in this paper, as well as from our other work, however, the following practical suggestions may be derived for doing ideological analysis:

1. Backgrounds. No serious ideological analysis is possible without at least some knowledge of the 'facts', viz., about the historical, political or social background of a conflict, its main participants, the grounds of the conflict and preceding positions and arguments. Many ideological moves precisely involve the self-serving use and abuse of the 'facts'.

2. Context. In order to understand the ideological position of the author (writer or speaker) describe the communicative context: group membership(s) of the author, the aims of the

communicative event, the genre, the intended audience(s), the setting (time, location), the medium, and so on. Through the contextual occasioning or functions of the discourse, also its ideological functions may be spelled out. For instance, an editorial may function as a critique and advice to specific (often elite) groups or institutions, and hence involves (power) relations between the media and media writers on the one hand, and these other groups, on the other. This context also defines the ideological dimension of the speech acts involved (e.g., warnings as a means to enact power).

3. Ideological categories. Ideologies are the basic 'axioms' of socially shared representations of groups about themselves and their relations to other groups, including such categories as membership criteria, activities, goals, values, and crucial group resources. Try to find expressions in the text that refer to these basic *categories* that define the *interests* or *identity* of the group the author belongs to.

4. Polarization. Many ideologies sustain and reproduce social conflict, domination and inequality. This conflict may involve any of type of interest (typically symbolic or material resources) mentioned above, and is characteristically organized in a polarized way, that is represented as Us vs. Them. This polarization is at the basis of much ideological discourse, viz., as the strategy of Positive self-presentation and Negative Other-presentation. Since ideologies involve values, they typically surface as evaluative beliefs or opinions. Find all *opinions* in the text that enact such *polarized evaluation* of Us and Them. Little discourse analytical expertise is necessary to do such an ideological 'reading' of the text.

5. The implicit. Ideological opinions however are not always expressed in a very explicit way. That is, very often they are implied, presupposed, hidden, denied or taken for granted. Hence it is necessary to examine, more systematically, the *semantic structure* of the text for various forms of implication, indirectness or denial, as shown above. Indeed, seemingly non-evaluative, non-ideological descriptions of 'facts' may imply positive opinions about Us and negative opinions Them. Also the ways the sentences of the discourse cohere (e.g., on the basis of causality) may be part of this implicit manifestation of ideology. Similarly, the overall coherence of the discourse in terms of topics or themes indicates what information (and what ideological opinions) are deemed more or less important, thus reflecting the structures of the underlying ideological mental models, attitudes and ideologies.

6. Formal structures. Indirectly, also the various forms of a discourse may be involved in the expression or signalling of ideological positions. Also here the ideological square of polarization applies: Structural features may emphasize or de-emphasize information or opinions about Us and Them. Sound structures in talk (e.g., intonation, stress, volume, 'tone', applause, laughs); graphical structures in printed text (headlines, columns, placing, letter type, fotos, etc.); the overall (schematic) organization of the discourse (e.g., argumentation); lexical choice and variation in the description of Us vs. Them; and the syntactic structure of clauses and sentences.

In sum, (a) examine the context of the discourse, (b) analyze which groups, power relations and conflicts are involved, (c) look for positive and negative opinions about Us and Them, (d) spell out the presupposed and the implied, and (e) examine all formal structures that (de)emphasize polarized group opinions.

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